Hearing Transcript

## 2017 Automobile Insurance Review

## September 13, 2018

## PRESENT:

Darlene Whalen, Chair and CEO
Dwanda Newman, Vice-Chair
James Oxford, Commissioner

## Board Counsel/Staff:

Ryan Oake, Regulatory Analyst
Peter O'Flaherty, Q.C., Hearing Counsel

## Presenters:

Dr. Fred Lazar
Presenting on behalf of the Campaign

## Campaign to Protect Accident Victims

Colin Feltham
Jerome Kennedy, Q.C.
Consumer Advocate
Dennis Browne, Q.C.
Andrew Wadden
Insurance Bureau of Canada (IBC)
Amanda Dean
Kevin Stamp, Q.C.
Trevor Foster
Spinal Cord Injury NL
Thomas Fraize, Q.C.
Lara Fraize-Burry
Michael Burry

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(9:15 a.m.)
CHAIR:
Q. Good morning, everybody. I guess we're
    going to go right to the Campaign. You can
    introduce your presenter.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Chair and
    Commissioners. This morning we have Dr.
    Fred Lazar with us, and Dr. Lazar is here to
    review or present, I guess, his report which
    has been supplied to the Board entitled,
    "Estimated Overpayments of Automobile
    Insurance Premiums in Newfoundland and
    Labrador 2012 to 2016", which has already
    been filed with the Board. I'll note that
    the report is co-authored with Dr. Eli
    Prisman, and Dr. Prisman could not be here
    today, only Dr. Lazar was available, given
    we were only working with a small set of
    dates. I did, and I hope it was received,
    supply two CV documents; one for Dr. Lazar
    and one for Dr. Prisman to the Board. So
    the CV of Dr. Prisman, it is available, even
    though he isn't present. Good morning, Dr.
    Lazar?
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            Page 2
    A. Good morning.
    MR. FELTHAM:
    Q. Thank you for agreeing to be here today, and
        to share your thoughts with the Board. I
        know it was a late arrival for you, or early
        morning arrival, I guess, really, with some
        flight issues. I'd like to begin, Doctor,
        with just reviewing your CV a little bit,
        some of your background, credentials, and
        qualifications and that sort of thing. Dr.
        Lazar, you're a professor at York
        University?
    DR. LAZAR:
    A. Yes.
    MR. FELTHAM:
    Q. And how long has that been the case?
    DR. LAZAR:
    A. It seems like forever. I've lost track,
        45/46 years.
    MR. FELTHAM:
    Q. And your CV indicates that you're in the
        Department of Economics?
    A. Department of Economics, cross-appointed
    Page 2

## DR. LAZAR: <br> DR. LAZAR:

A. Good morning.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Thank you for agreeing to be here today, and to share your thoughts with the Board. I know it was a late arrival for you, or early morning arrival, I guess, really, with some flight issues. I'd like to begin, Doctor, with just reviewing your CV a little bit, some of your background, credentials, and qualifications and that sort of thing. Dr. University?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And how long has that been the case?
A. It seems like forever. I've lost track, 45/46 years.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And your CV indicates that you're in the Department of Economics?

## DR. LAZAR: <br> DR. LAZAR:

A. Department of Economics, cross-appointed
between the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Applied Professional Studies, and Schulich School of Business.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And in terms of your role as professor, what sort of - what do you teach there, what are your areas?
DR. LAZAR:
A. My economics area, used to be the Department of Arts, taught just about every course, but primarily international trade and finance, industrial organization which deals with competitive behaviour strategy, and in the business school a course called Economics for Management. It's really the application of economic concepts to decision making.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And competitive behaviour strategy, what is that?
DR. LAZAR:
A. That's looking at market structures, how firms compete in different market structures, how those market structures evolve, and discussions of how should companies develop strategies to gain an advantage in the marketplace.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And I note from your CV just in terms of formal education, you graduated from University of Toronto in 1969, went on to complete post-graduate degree at Harvard University, the last of which was a PhD in 1978. What's the PhD in?

## DR. LAZAR:

A. It's in economics. My dissertation was on male racial unemployment rate differences in the US, so I started in the labour economics field.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And I won't belabour this, but you've listed in your CV a number of books and journal publications and that spans - the ones you've listed here in terms of the journal work runs into about 2015, I believe, and I note that one of the journals referred to is, if we look at the bottom of page two, risk management and insurance review?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

25 MR. FELTHAM:

|  | Page 5 | Page 7 |  |  |
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| 1 | Q. And the title of the article is, | 1 |  | for automobile insurance companies in |
| 2 | "Regulator's Determination of Return on | 2 |  | Ontario. When you mentioned you worked for |
| 3 | Equity in the Absence of Public Firms: The | 3 |  | FSCO, is that what you were talking about? |
| 4 | Case of Automobile Insurance in Ontario". | 4 |  | AZAR: |
| 5 | DR. LAZAR: | 5 | A. | Yes. Eli and I were retained by FSCO |
| 6 | A. Yes. | 6 |  | because they had to respond to the Auditor |
| 7 | MR. FELTHAM: | 7 |  | General of Ontario's comment that they |
| 8 | Q. And that was in 2015? | 8 |  | hadn't reviewed the return on equity in |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 |  | about 15 years, so we were retained to |
| 10 | A. Yes. | 10 |  | examine how they would determine what might |
| 11 | MR. FELTHAM: | 11 |  | be an appropriate return on equity for |
| 12 | Q. And that's a peer review journal? | 12 |  | automobile insurance companies. |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 14 | A. All of these are. | 14 | Q. | And then if we move on to your professional |
| 15 | MR. FELTHAM: | 15 |  | consulting activities, and it says in |
| 16 | Q. Okay, and that was co-authored with Dr. | 16 |  | brackets over 40 years, I guess, there |
| 17 | Prisman as well. | 17 |  | appears to be - you've done a mix of public |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 |  | and private in that regard? |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 |  | AZAR: |
| 20 | MR. FELTHAM: | 20 | A. | I started basically in the public sector, |
| 21 | Q. Is that of a similar nature to what you've | 21 |  | more idealistic at the time, and I don't |
| 22 | done here in terms of the subject matter? | 22 |  | think it really have changed, just learned a |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 |  | lesson of how the system works, and then |
| 24 | A. No, it really is an extension of the work | 24 |  | sort of evolved into the private sector, and |
| 25 | that we did for FSCO, where, you know, | 25 |  | then more recently combining the two. |
|  | Page 6 |  |  | Page 8 |
| 1 | traditionally in applying the capital asset | 1 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 2 | pricing model, one uses data for public | 2 | Q. | And in terms of the work that you've done |
| 3 | companies. In this particular case, we were | 3 |  | here that we're going to discuss today, have |
| 4 | dealing with largely a mix of public and | 4 |  | you done work of a similar nature before? |
| 5 | private companies. Even the public | 5 |  | AZAR: |
| 6 | companies, there was really no public data | 6 | A. | Again the original work was for FSCO. Prior |
| 7 | available, so we had to resort to use of | 7 |  | to that, Eli and I did comparable work for |
| 8 | accounting data rather than publicly | 8 |  | the Ontario Energy Board with regards to |
| 9 | reported financial data. | 9 |  | local electricity distribution companies, |
| 10 | MR. FELTHAM: | 10 |  | and following that work for FSCO, that's |
| 11 | Q. And if I go to page three of your CV, I note | 11 |  | when the Ontario Trial Lawyers contacted us |
| 12 | you've listed quite a number of instances | 12 |  | and asked us just to apply a methodology to |
| 13 | when you've worked as expert witness? | 13 |  | the experience in Ontario, so that's sort of |
| 14 | DR. LAZAR: | 14 |  | the history in this particular area. |
| 15 | A. Yes. | 15 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 16 | MR. FELTHAM: | 16 | Q. | And I'll get to the Ontario Trial Lawyers |
| 17 | Q. In different types of hearings. It appears | 17 |  | piece in just a second. Before I do, the |
| 18 | largely regulatory type hearings? | 18 |  | Ontario Energy Board work, can you explain |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 |  | what was done there? Who was the client, I |
| 20 | A. Yes. | 20 |  | guess, and what was - more specifically what |
| 21 | MR. FELTHAM: | 21 |  | you were doing? |
| 22 | Q. And the last one, I guess, this is what | 22 |  | AZAR: |
| 23 | you're referring to work with FSCO, | 23 | A. | It was again the Ontario Energy Board, the |
| 24 | indicates Financial Services Commission of | 24 |  | regulator, and I believe in their case as |
| 25 | Ontario, calculating the return on equity | 25 |  | well it was the Auditor General that had |


|  | Page 9 | Page 11 |  |  |
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|  | suggested that they review their | 1 |  | Again the realized returns on equity have |
| 2 | determination of rate of return on equity | 2 |  | for most companies far exceeded what would |
| 3 | rules for the local electricity | 3 |  | have been appropriate levels, and the gap |
| 4 | distributors. So it was similar work that | 4 |  | had risen, at least up until las year, so |
| 5 | we did with FSCO, but a different sample, | 5 |  | that there seemed to be an indication that |
| 6 | different group of companies. | 6 |  | there were significant overpayments for |
| 7 | FELTHAM: | 7 |  | automobile insurance. |
| 8 | Q. And then you mentioned for the Ontario Trial | 8 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 9 | Lawyers Association. A couple of those | 9 | Q | And you describe it as overpayments. What |
| 10 | gentlemen were here yesterday. When did you | 10 |  | do you mean by that? |
| 1 | - I guess, what did you do for the Ontario | 11 |  | AZAR: |
| 12 | Trial Lawyers Association and when? | 12 | A. | Again if the regulator in Ontario's FSCO, if |
| 13 | LAZAR: | 13 |  | they had gone with the recommendations we |
| 14 | A. I'm trying to remember the original one, | 14 |  | made and incorporated those return on |
| 15 | 2014, 2015, they asked Eli and me to look at | 15 |  | equities in their rate determinations, then |
| 16 | what had been the experience in Ontario to | 16 |  | the premiums that would have been awarded or |
| 17 | try to assess whether consumers of | 17 |  | permitted, and this is really sort of a |
| 18 | automobile insurance were paying the right | 18 |  | maximum the insurance companies could have |
| 19 | price, paying too much, too little, and | 19 |  | always charged less for competitive reasons |
| 20 | they've come back to me on two other | 20 |  | or for other reasons, that those premiums |
| 21 | occasions, 2016 and this year, to update the | 21 |  | would have been less than the premiums that |
| 22 | reports, which I have done. Again I've | 22 |  | are actually charged inferred from their |
| 23 | taken the original report and just | 23 |  | realized returns on equities. |
| 24 | incorporating more recent data into the | 24 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 25 | analysis. | 25 | Q. | So in terms of the return on equities or the |
|  | Page 10 |  |  | Page 12 |
|  | MR. FELTHAM: | 1 |  | return on equity was in excess of what, in |
| 2 | Q. Same methodology, just changing the data to | 2 |  | your opinion, the appropriate target return |
| 3 | update? | 3 |  | on equity would have been? |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 |  | AZAR: |
| 5 | A. Methodology is not going to change, just the | 5 | A | Yes. |
| 6 | data have changed. | 6 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 7 | FELTHAM: | 7 | Q. | Okay. |
| 8 | Q. Dr. Lazar, at a high level, what were the | 8 |  | AZAR: |
| 9 | results in Ontario from this study? | 9 | A. | I mean, the correct analysis, and because of |
| 10 | LAZAR: | 10 |  | lack of data, we had to use this |
| 11 | A. At the high level, again what sort of | 11 |  | methodology, would have been to look at, |
| 12 | underlied our methodology, so the original | 12 |  | okay, what were the premiums that were |
| 13 | work, and then the follow up work was to | 13 |  | actually awarded based on the information |
| 14 | look at the estimates of the actual realized | 14 |  | available when the premiums were permitted, |
| 15 | returns on equity of the individual | 15 |  | and compare those premiums to what they |
| 16 | insurance companies, and then collectively, | 16 |  | should have been with different return on |
| 17 | and compared that to what should have been | 17 |  | equities, you know, Eli and my estimates, |
| 18 | an appropriate return on equity. Also | 18 |  | and what would have been more reasonable |
| 19 | looking at what might have been a more | 19 |  | expense allowances, and the gap between |
| 20 | appropriate expense ratios over time in | 20 |  | those two would have been a measure of the |
| 21 | light of technological developments. | 21 |  | overpayments. |
| 22 | MR. FELTHAM: | 22 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 23 | Q. And what was found in Ontario in terms of | 23 | Q. | And I gather then the - I mean, we've talked |
| 24 | the results? | 24 |  | about Ontario thus far and the work that you |
| 25 | DR. LAZAR: | 25 |  | did there with respect to return on equity |


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|  | in automobile insurance companies. In terms | 1 | our estimates of what should have been the |
| 2 | of this report, your report, July, 2018, | 2 | regulated return on equity, and whenever |
| 3 | you've now at the request of the Campaign to | 3 | they were greater, obviously that was an |
| 4 | Protect Accident Victims, taken that | 4 | indication that, you know, the premiums that |
| 5 | methodology and applied it to Newfoundland | 5 | were allowed were greater than what they |
| 6 | and Labrador data, is that correct? | 6 | would have been or should have been if our |
| 7 | LAZAR: | 7 | return on equity numbers had been used. |
| 8 | A. The difference is that we had to apply the | 8 | 0 a.m.) |
| 9 | capital asset pricing model to those | 9 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 10 | insurance companies operating in | 10 | Q. And you mentioned MSA Research. Let's just |
| 11 | Newfoundland in determining what would have | 11 | deal with that for a second. I guess, what |
| 12 | been, based on that model, appropriate | 12 | is that and why was that necessary to do |
| 13 | returns on equities, and they differed from | 13 | that, to use them? |
| 14 | those in Ontario largely because if you | 14 | LAZAR: |
| 15 | applied the capital asset pricing model, | 15 | A. We originally approached GISA for data on |
| 16 | there was a different data, a different risk | 16 | individual companies. In the absence of |
| 17 | factor, slightly higher one for Newfoundland | 17 | having data on individual companies, you |
| 18 | than for Ontario. | 18 | can't apply the capital asset pricing model. |
| 19 | ELTHAM: | 19 | The data don't exist. Again Eli was |
| 20 | Q. Okay, and we'll get a little bit | 20 | conducting sort of negotiations. For |
| 21 | that. I'll get you to explain it somewhat | 21 | whatever reason, GISA was either unwilling |
| 22 | further in the report, but if we start at | 22 | to provide us with the data in the format we |
| 23 | the top here, I guess, and look at page four | 23 | required, or the cost proved to be |
| 24 | of your report, here we have your executive | 24 | excessive, so we then resorted to MSA, whom |
| 25 | summary. So you've laid this out in four | 25 | we had used for the work we did for FSCO. |
|  | Page 14 |  | Page 16 |
| 1 | points. You've indicated that you've looked | 1 | So we were familiar with them, and they were |
| 2 | - well, it's done in a question form, but | 2 | able to format the data for us so that we |
| 3 | number one, "Are the conclusions of the | 3 | could input it into the model very quickly, |
| 4 | report by Oliver Wyman for the Board of | 4 | and we could do it on schedule and at much |
| 5 | Commissioners of Public Utilities for | 5 | lower cost. |
| 6 | Newfoundland and Labrador valid', and I'm | 6 | FELTHAM: |
| 7 | going to change the order a little bit and | 7 | Q. I mean, what is MSA Research, what are they? |
| 8 | I'm going to deal with that issue last as we | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | go through the report, or I'd like you to | 9 | A. I've got it here, the official name. Okay, |
| 10 | deal with that issue last. Going to number | 10 | MSA Research, they work with what's called |
| 11 | two, "What has been the real experience of | 11 | the National Insurance Conference of Canada |
| 12 | auto insurance companies in Newfoundland and | 12 | and they essentially - I'm not sure if |
| 13 | Labrador"? What do you mean there when you | 13 | they're an independent group or - they do |
| 14 | say, "What has been the real experience"? | 14 | work with GISA, they do get data from GISA, |
| 15 | LAZAR: | 15 | as well as from the insurance companies, and |
| 16 | A. Okay, again Eli and I used data provided by | 16 | I know in the work we did for FSCO, FSCO |
| 17 | MSA Research, and they use - they rely on | 17 | relied considerably on this group for data |
| 18 | GISA data and other data. So we had, I | 18 | for rate determinations. |
| 19 | think, 15/18 companies, somewhere in that | 19 | . FELTHAM: |
| 20 | range. I apologize, I do not remember the | 20 | Q. So number two, "What has been the real |
| 21 | exact number. I can look in the appendix | 21 | experience of auto insurance companies in |
| 22 | and see the exact number. What we did was | 22 | this province". Number three, "How does |
| 23 | let's estimate what their actual return on | 23 | this experience compare to what would have |
| 24 | equity for their operation in Newfoundland | 24 | been considered a fair return on equity for |
| 25 | and Labrador had been, and compare those to | 25 | these companies", and we'll get into this in |


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| 1 | some more detail, and I think you've sort of | 1 | subsidiaries, Primmum and Security National, |
| 2 | already mentioned this, but what are we | 2 | and three other companies with average |
| 3 | talking about there? | 3 | negative ROE's over the entire period, 2011 |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | to 2016, the weighted average ROE's for the |
| 5 | A. Essentially, again the gap between the | 5 | remaining companies increased 12.2 percent |
| 6 | realized returns on equities, and the return | 6 | over the period, 2011 to 2016. Obviously, |
| 7 | on equities that Eli and I estimated would | 7 | the companies that have been profitable have |
| 8 | have been appropriate in light of financial | 8 | been very profitable". So, I guess, |
| 9 | market developments. | 9 | essentially then you determined once you |
| 10 | MR. FELTHAM: | 10 | took certain, I'll call them under |
| 11 | Q. Okay. Finally, the fourth item, "What are | 11 | performing companies from the analysis, that |
| 12 | the implications for the aggregate premiums | 12 | the results were positive ROEs? |
| 13 | paid by drivers in Newfoundland and | 13 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 14 | Labrador", what does that mean? | 14 | A. Yes, but they were positive for the entire |
| 15 | DR. LAZAR: | 15 | sample. They were just much larger when you |
| 16 | A. Which one is this? | 16 | excluded those particular companies. |
| 17 | MR. FELTHAM: | 17 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 18 | Q. Sorry, number four, "What are the | 18 | Q. And then, I guess if we look at the next |
| 19 | implications for the aggregate premiums paid | 19 | step here, if we go over to page 5 and item |
| 20 | by drivers in Newfoundland and Labrador". | 20 | 3, "How much have consumers in Newfoundland |
| 21 | I'm just wondering what are we talking about | 21 | and Labrador overpaid?" And this I guess is |
| 22 | there? | 22 | the answer to the comparison of the realized |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | ROEs versus what the targets ought to have |
| 24 | A. Okay, I thought you were referring to point | 24 | been? |
| 25 | four here. | 25 | DR. LAZAR: |
|  | Page 18 |  | Page 20 |
| 1 | MR. FELTHAM: | 1 | A. Yes. |
| 2 | Q. Oh, no, sorry. | 2 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 3 | DR. LAZAR: | 3 | Q. And you note there that, "For the companies |
| 4 | A. The implications, again depending on what | 4 | with average positive ROEs, the estimated |
| 5 | sample of companies you use, that there | 5 | upper limit for aggregate overpayments is |
| 6 | seemed to have been over this period of 2013 | 6 | $\$ 92$ million. For the companies with |
| 7 | to 2016, overpayments that ranged, I | 7 | positive ROEs, the estimated overpayments |
| 8 | believe, depending on the methodology, | 8 | represent about 8.6 percent of the total |
| 9 | somewhere between 4 or 5 percent, and 9 | 9 | premiums paid between 2011 and 2016." And |
| 10 | percent. | 10 | there's smaller print in italics below that. |
| 11 | MR. FELTHAM: | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | Q. Before we leave your executive summary | 12 | A. Right. |
| 13 | because it's expanded upon a little bit in | 13 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 14 | terms of summary answers, I guess, to the | 14 | Q. Which notes that, "For all companies, |
| 15 | issues, I'd like to review that and then | 15 | excluding Primmum and Security National, the |
| 16 | we'll get into a little bit more detail | 16 | upper limit for aggregate overpayments |
| 17 | about how you got there. So if we start | 17 | during the period 2011 to 2016 is 54 million |
| 18 | with, and again I mentioned I'm going to | 18 | dollars." So, let me see-I want to make |
| 19 | skip over number one here, which is the | 19 | sure we understand this. So, I gather that |
| 20 | conclusions of Oliver Wyman, we'll get back | 20 | you're giving us a range here, depending on |
| 21 | to that, I want to focus first on the work | 21 | whether we just exclude the two TD companies |
| 22 | that you did and your own estimations. So | 22 | or also exclude a couple of others who have |
| 23 | number two, "ROE's for auto insurance | 23 | had similar negative performance and that |
| 24 | companies in Newfoundland and Labrador", and | 24 | for that five-year period, 2011 to 2016, I |
| 25 | you note here, "When we exclude the TD | 25 | guess it's five years, anyway 2011 to 2016, |


|  | Page 21 |  | Page 23 |
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| 1 | the overpayment estimate is somewhere | 1 | assumptions, there is no way that we could |
| 2 | between 54 million dollars and 92 million | 2 | determine what the premiums could have been |
| 3 | dollars for consumers in this province? | 3 | with a different set of assumptions, so as |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | to be able to simply calculate the |
| 5 | A. Yes, but as we point out, that's sort of the | 5 | differences. |
| 6 | upper limit. | 6 | . FELTHAM: |
| 7 | FELTHAM: | 7 | Q. And if we go to your report, page 24 next. |
| 8 | Yes. | 8 | And so, I gather here what we have is - and |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | you can take us through the explanation, but |
| 10 | A. Were there over the entire period | 10 | hese are the results in terms of the return |
| 11 | overpayments? Most likely. What was the | 11 | on equity calculations for the various |
| 12 | value? As I said, the only way to determine | 12 | insurers over the period examined? |
| 13 | that with greater certainty is if one had | 13 | LAZAR: |
| 14 | access to sort of other data. What were the | 14 | A. Yes. |
| 15 | aggregate premiums that were permitted to | 15 | R. FELTHAM: |
| 16 | the insurance companies? And two, what | 16 | Q. You earlier mentioned that a couple of |
| 17 | would have been the aggregate premium | 17 | companies were excluded, Security National |
| 18 | permitted to the insurance companies with | 18 | and Primmum Insurance. I gather that's TD |
| 19 | lower return on equity assumptions, lower | 19 | Insurance? It's my understanding. |
| 20 | operating expense assumptions? And the gap | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | between the two would have reflected the | 21 | A. Yes. |
| 22 | overpayments regardless | 22 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 23 | insurance company-the actual performance of | 23 | Q. Yes. And if I look at those, since--well in |
| 24 | the insurance companies. | 24 | the case of Security National, since 2013, |
| 25 | MR. FELTHAM: | 25 | every year recording a negative ROE, and |
|  | Page 22 |  | Page 24 |
| 1 | Q. And Dr. Lazar, I want to pick up on a phrase | 1 | ranging from--you know, in 2015 it was |
| 2 | that you've used there. You say, "If one | 2 | negative 247 down to negative 20 I guess in |
| 3 | had access to the data," and we've also | 3 | 2013. And Primmum similarly, but from 2014 |
| 4 | talked a lot about estimating. You know, | 4 | consistently negative. So, because--you |
| 5 | why is it that we're estimating, and you | 5 | note that some companies were excluded from |
| 6 | know, why it is that we don't-you know, if | 6 | the analysis. Can you tell us I guess why |
| 7 | one had access to the data? What is it-what | 7 | that was done? What's the economic |
| 8 | are you telling us? | 8 | rationale for doing that and why is it |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | reasonable to do it in your view? |
| 10 | A. You know, Eli and I don't have access to the | 10 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 11 | decisions made by the Board, at least we | 11 | A. Now, with the case of the TD companies we |
| 12 | didn't have it when we did the report, don't | 12 | found similar results in Ontario. That- |
| 13 | have it now. They might be available. So, | 13 | again, if you apply standard economic |
| 14 | we don't know. Here, so the aggregate | 14 | reasoning, if a company is consistently |
| 15 | premiums that were awarded which would have | 15 | losing money then in one particular line of |
| 16 | been different from the actual premiums that | 16 | business and this is part of a much broader |
| 17 | were paid, you know, if the Board sets an | 17 | line of business, they're doing so because |
| 18 | upper limit, it's up to the insurance | 18 | they're using that line of business as a |
| 19 | companies-they can set rates below that for | 19 | lost leader for their other financial |
| 20 | various reasons. In addition, we wouldn't | 20 | services. So, that's what we concluded with |
| 21 | have access to the claims, so expectations | 21 | TD. I mean, if you look at RBC, they were |
| 22 | that were built into these decisions. So, | 22 | losing money. I think they've exited from |
| 23 | in the absence of having-not having those | 23 | the insurance, auto insurance industry. |
| 24 | data, even though we have return in equity | 24 | There are a couple of other companies in |
| 25 | assumptions, we can-I'll have expense | 25 | Ontario that when they were acquired by |

1 other companies, Fairfax acquired some
-
insurance companies that were doing poorly, within a year or two, Fairfax turned them around. So, if a company is losing money, it's going to either exit the industry if it is not a lost leader, or if it continues in business, it's using this to promote other lines of business. So, they're willing to tolerate a loss here. It's an investment in order to generate profits in other lines of business. Another possibility is that again firms that for one or two years experience negative results, negative returns on equity, losses, they're doing so perhaps to increase market share. So, they're competing more aggressively. They'll cut price to increase market share. If they succeed, then one should expect the prices to sort of rise up. The return in equity is to improve. If that doesn't happen, chances are they'll exit the industry. Then there's a third possibility and this is using transfer pricing to shift around profits from higher tax jurisdictions to lower tax jurisdictions. And if you look at corporate
A. Yes.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. If I go to the bottom of page 25, and rightwell, I guess it is sort of the last full paragraph that starts with "Furthermore." This is--right above that you reviewed what you just talked about in terms of the experience with TD Insurance and companies of a similar nature, but in-here you say, "Furthermore, the reported or estimated ROEs might be quite misleading with regards to the ability of a company to attract capital to a particular line. As well, without detailed information about the intricacies of intra-corporate transfer pricing and other accounting practices, it is very difficult to measure the real profitability of any one line of business for a P\&C company." What are we talking about there?

## DR. LAZAR:

A. Okay, and if you look at the major automobile insurance companies that operate in this province, most of them operate automobile insurance in most if not all of the other provinces, and most of them also

Page 26
tax rates at a provincial level, chances are quite good that most of the automobile insurance companies are doing this, trying to perhaps understate their profits in Newfoundland and Labrador because the corporate tax rate is what, 15 percent at the provincial level, and shifting them to lower tax regimes, in particular Ontario and Alberta that have rates, I think what-Ontario is about $11 \frac{1}{2}$ percent, Alberta is 12 percent. Even BC has a lower rate. So, some of the cases might simply be, you know, shift the profits, diminish your profits, perhaps even generate some losses for one reason or another. And again, all of these legitimate reasons for companies to behalf in this way, but that tends to sort of muddy the waters when it comes to trying to figure out, have consumers in this province ended paying too much of the proper amount or too little as a result?
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Like trying to determine the real experience I guess as you put it?
DR. LAZAR:

|  | Page 29 |  | Page 31 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | internally what's the profitability of the | 1 | of the team, Prem Watsa and his team, to |
| 2 | different business units and to determine | 2 | generate superb returns from their |
| 3 | the performance bonuses for the people | 3 | investment activities. So, the insurance |
|  | running these. And then, from a tax point | 4 | companies have access and they have to look, |
| 5 | of view, you'll have different cost | 5 | how are we going to invest this to sort of |
| 6 | allocations in order to try to minimize your | 6 | generate returns, boost our profitability? |
| 7 | tax liability. I don't have privy to those | 7 | And you've got a whole range of financial |
| 8 | data. Unless you happen to be the tax | 8 | assets. To simplify them, you know, invest |
| 9 | authority, CRA, nobody else has access | 9 | in real estate, you can invest in a whole |
| 10 | that information other than the companies | 10 | range of bonds, government to corporate, |
| 1 | and a possibility of CRA. | 11 | different sort of ratings, or you can invest |
| 12 | (9:45 a.m.) | 12 | in equities. And every insurance company |
| 1 | MR. FELTHAM: | 13 | has their own sort of investment strategy. |
| 1 | Q. And if we go over to page 26, Dr. Lazar, | 14 | Most, if not all, are going to invest part |
| 15 | table 14, and I'll just-I'll to the | 15 | of this portfolio in equities. And you |
| 16 | paragraph below the table to give us some | 16 | know, if you invest in bonds, the returns |
| 17 | background here. So, it says, "It is quite | 17 | there tend to be more stable. Real estate, |
| 18 | clear that the annual returns on investments | 18 | ess stable than bonds, but more stable |
| 19 | in equities fluctuate widely from year to | 19 | likely than equities. Equities are going to |
| 20 | year. Therefore, it is not surprising that | 20 | be the most variable component. |
| 21 | the annual ROEs of auto insurance companies | 21 | FELTHAM: |
| 22 | also fluctuated from year to year. The net | 22 | Q. And what are you showing us in the table? |
| 23 | investment returns were relatively more | 23 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 24 | stable than the S\&P TSX total returns. | 24 | A. In this particular table, essentially |
| 25 | Furthermore, our estimates of the aggregate | 25 | showing that, you know, returns on equity |
|  | Page 30 |  | Page 32 |
| 1 | ROIs exceed the ROI assumptions of OW," | 1 | year to year can bounce around. You can |
| 2 | which is Oliver Wynman, "reinforcing our | 2 | have losses, you can have extremely good |
| 3 | earlier comments that Oliver Wynman likely | 3 | returns. The performance of the auto |
| 4 | has underestimated the profitability of | 4 | insurance companies, the greater stability I |
| 5 | automobile insurance companies in the | 5 | think is the reflection of the fact that |
| 6 | province and overestimated their premium | 6 | they haven't invested 100 percent in equity. |
| 7 | deficiencies during the period 2012 to '16." | 7 | There is a mix with a considerable |
| 8 | Can you take us through-I mean what we | 8 | allocation to more stable bonds, but |
| 9 | seeing here? What's the relevance of this | 9 | nevertheless, the returns are going to be |
| 10 | table? | 10 | driven in part by what happens in the equity |
| 11 | LAZAR: | 11 | markets. |
| 12 | A. Okay. Now, the P\&C companies are going to | 12 | R. FELTHAM: |
| 13 | use sort of the reserves to invest them. | 13 | Q. And if we move down on page 26 to the last |
| 14 | You want to earn something on them, and | 14 | paragraph, I'm going to just read that to |
| 15 | that's sort of a major driver of the | 15 | you. "The auto insurance companies with |
| 16 | profitability. I mean, you look at two | 16 | positive ROEs throughout the 2011-2016 |
| 17 | classic examples. Warren Buffett with | 17 | period accounted for about 75 percent of |
| 18 | Berkshire Hathaway, really what underlies | 18 | total premiums over the entire period, |
| 19 | that operation is insurance, and he's got a | 19 | ranging from a low of 66 percent of total |
| 20 | phenomenal track record obviously with this | 20 | premiums in 2016 to a high of 82 percent in |
| 21 | team of investing those reserves to generate | 21 | 2011. When Primmum and Security National |
| 22 | you know remarkable returns. In the case of | 22 | are excluded, the companies with positive |
| 23 | Canada, we have Fairfax Financial which | 23 | ROEs accounted for 84 percent of the total" |
| 24 | again largely a P\&C company, and their | 24 | "of the remaining total premiums over the |
| 25 | returns are driven primarily by the ability | 25 | period 2011 to 2016." What's the |

DR. LAZAR:
A. Oh, just pointing out that the companies
that were profitable for this entire period
were major players in the market in
Newfoundland and Labrador. They weren't a
small, you know, relatively insignificant
component of that market.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. And then, if we go over to page 27,
at the bottom, page 27. There we go. I
guess there and onto page 28 you explain how
you estimated potential overpayments, and
you say, "Using these data, we estimated
potential premium overpayments as follows.
Whenever the realized ROEs exceeded the ROEs
we estimated for the auto insurance
industry, it is likely that premiums were
too high, and as a result, drivers in
Newfoundland and Labrador paid too much for
auto insurance. In table 16 we report the
gaps," and you talked about the gaps
earlier, "when they are positive between the
realized pre-tax ROEs and the CAPM ROEs for
two groups of companies, all companies
Page 34
excluding Primmum and Security National, and
only the companies that reported average
positive ROEs over the entire period." So,
when the realized ROEs exceeded the ROEs
that were estimated to be appropriate, that
equals overpayment?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. And then, page 29, that brings us to
your sort of final results, if you will.
And if we look at the chart at the top, I
guess there's sort of two options, I'll call
them options. You either-you have the
results with the all companies excluding
only Primmum and Security National or all
the positive ROE companies? Am I reading
that correctly?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. So, I mean we look at that and you
know insurance companies are suggesting
private passenger automobile is not a
profitable venture in Newfoundland and
significance of that? What -
DR. LAZAR:
A. Oh, just pointing out that the companies that were profitable for this entire period were major players in the market in small, you know, relatively insignificant component of that market.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. And then, if we go over to page 27, at the bottom, page 27. There we go. I guess there and onto page 28 you explain how you estimated potential overpayments, and you say, "Using these data, we estimated Whenever the realized ROEs exceeded the ROEs we estimated for the auto insurance industry, it is likely that premiums were too high, and as a result, drivers in Newfoundland and Labrador paid too much for auto insurance. In table 16 we report the gaps," and you talked about the gaps earlier, "when they are positive between the two groups of companies, all companies

Page 34
Page 34
excluding Primmum and Security National, and

DR. LAZAR:
A. Well, again from an economic theory point of view, if an activity is not profitable, and it's consistently not profitable, you exit that line of business. You leave. You do not stay in it unless it's a lost leader to generate business in other financial or insurance services in that particular jurisdiction. So, if you're not in automobile insurance, you're not going to be a player or you're going to be a smaller player in those other fields. So, you'll take the losses in this activity because you're more than making up for it with profits in other activities. So, it's one or the other. So, you know, the argument is that the auto insurance in Newfoundland and Labrador is not profitable, well, if that were the case, then you look at the committed equity to this industry, the capital. If that argument is correct, you would expect the equity allocated to this business to have declined over time. The
data show otherwise. So that tends to dismiss that argument. So, could it be still unprofitable and your allocation of equity of capital could have increased? Possibly, if this is now being used as a loss leader. But it appears, based on the individual insurance companies, that this might be the case only for the TD subsidiaries, not for the others.

In the case of Intact, which had negative returns on equity I think the last two years, maybe three years, it appears in their case that Intact has been quite aggressive in competing for market share in all lines of business and has been quite successful in doing that, especially when you look at their aggregate profitability and the - while I haven't followed their share price that closely, they seem to have done quite well over different periods of time. So that strategy seems to be working for them, and I suspect if you look at the allocation of capital to this line of business in Newfoundland and Labrador, it has also been increasing, which suggests

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they expect this business to be profitable
in the future and this is part of their
strategy. They believe they have an
advantage in insurance in general across the
country and they're simply trying to expand
their market share, become a more prominent
player to grow more rapidly and then use
whatever internal advantages they have to
make it more profitable.
But it boils down to if it's
unprofitable, you're exiting the business
unless it's a loss leader and the data do
not support that argument that it's
unprofitable and you're exiting.
MR. FELTHAM:
And if we look at page 30, Dr. Lazar, that's
Q.
avere I was going next, which is the capital
availability piece that you're speaking of.
DR. LAZAR:
Yeah.
AR. FELTHAM:
Q. So, here specifically what were the
findings?
DR. LAZAR:
Again, there was some decline again for all
companies 2012 to 2013, but since then, it's been increasing steadily, even during those years like 2014, 2015 where profits eroded quite substantially because of significant increase in claims. Excluding the TD, subs
again decline from 2011 through to 2013 but a significant recovery. So, there does not appear to be any indication from these data that there has been any sort of continuous long term decline in the allocation of capital to this line of business in Newfoundland and Labrador.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And Doctor, I'd like now to turn to look at little bit at your assessment of some of the Oliver Wyman conclusions in their profitability study. To start, we can go to page nine of your report, and I guess we'll just confirm, but you reviewed as part of the work that you did, and this makes its way into some of your report, the Profit and Rate Adequacy Review, March 29 2018, that Oliver Wyman has done for this Board?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Okay. And okay, on page nine, this is your review of the Oliver Wyman key assumptions and one of the issues that is raised in that you raise and that makes its way into the Oliver Wyman report as well is the use of the ten percent ROE target, and I gather Oliver Wyman is using that as their benchmark. They've accepted that that's what it ought to be, not to have been. And the figure, as I understand it, comes from benchmark setting process that this Board engaged in in 2005 and it's been that way ever since.

But you - I'll put it this way. You take issue with just simply using that ten percent from 2005 as the benchmark. I guess, firstly, I mean, could Oliver Wyman have examined whether a ten percent target was appropriate? Is that something they could have done?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yeah, I mean, they have access to or could have - yeah, could have easily obtained access to individual company financial
information, their accounting information. The capital asset pricing model is widely known. It's been around for a long time. Anyone doing any work related to finance would know how to use it, how to apply it, and Oliver Wyman does have experts in that field in their consulting operations. Also, it would not have been a difficult exercise if they had been asked, and I suspect they weren't asked, but if they had been asked to look at was the ten percent return on equity still appropriate in light of financial market developments from 2005 to the present time.
(10:00 a.m.)

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. And if I just go to that under "Key Assumptions" on page nine, the bottom paragraph says "The key assumptions involve claim costs, operating costs and ROI". That's Oliver Wyman's key assumptions you refer to there, right?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And "OW, Oliver Wyman, should have included ROE, but apparently they were not asked whether the ten percent after tax ROE introduced in 2005 was appropriate throughout the period 2007 to 2017." And you just referred to that. "We do examine this question for if the target ROE should have been set at a different level each year, the premium adequacy, the estimates of Oliver Wyman would be misleading." So, how so? Why might they have been misleading then? What do you mean?

## DR. LAZAR:

A. I mean, if Oliver Wyman was simply presenting here are the facts over this period of time, this is what happened, without commentary whether premiums were adequate or not, whether there's overpayments or underpayments, say "here are the data; here are the facts" without commentary, I mean, I would have had no problems with it. But they then proceeded to try to estimate what the under or overpayments of insurance premiums might be
in 2017 based on the data that they used and that's where we begin to take issue.

If they're going to now look at the adequacy of premiums, then you have to start with the following: one, is the return on equity that's permitted by the Board appropriate in light of what's happened in financial markets? You know, going back 2009-2010, people have said well, the interest rate - interest rates sort of normally low. This is really an aberration. They're going to pop back up to historical levels. We've been hearing that now for nine years and it hasn't changed much. So, what's an aberration? When will interest rates return to those levels? So, one had to look at this is not a short term aberration in having historically low interest rates. This seems to have been a fundamental change. And that should then translate into what might have been appropriate return on equities, just plain common sense.

Second, expense ratio. Why use historical values? Why not look at best
practices? Look at technology and how this will affect how the insurance market should operate, could operate, and build those into the analysis.

And then return on investment, well, you look at the GISA data or MSA data and you look at the accounting data that Oliver Wyman used and you say, well, you know, the differences are too large. They should have then examined why and adjusted accordingly.

So, if they're going to use the past to try to estimate what is - you know, what's the nature of the under or overpayments of premiums going forward, then you have to address these questions and that's where Eli and I took issue with her analysis.

## MR. FELTHAM:

Q. And if I can take you to page 16 of your report under 3.0. I gather this is the portion of your report where you provide some detailed consideration of what the appropriate ROE target level ought to be is where this begins I believe?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

## STAMP, Q.C.:

Q. What page are you at? I'm sorry.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Page 16.

DR. LAZAR:
A. Yes.

MR. FELTHAM:
Q. So, firstly, I note that you refer here and you quote fairly extensively to some decisions of this Board. You refer to those. Can you take us through that a little bit and why - give us some context of why are you making those references? What does that help us understand?
DR. LAZAR:
A. As you say that this Board, like regulatory boards not only dealing with auto insurance but with other areas, electric utilities, gas utilities, et cetera, across Canada and across Canada US, have recognized increasingly, probably over the past 10-15 years, that the capital asset pricing model is the tool to use to try to determine what is an appropriate return on equity for these regulated entities. And I'm just using the

|  | Page 45 |  | Page 47 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Board's decision here. So, they acknowledge | 1 | business. You might as well use your |
| 2 | that this is the case. They accept this and | 2 | capital and invest it in that government |
| 3 | they believe going forward this is the model | 3 | bond. So, what's the risk that the company |
| 4 | that should be used. | 4 | undertakes for which it expects to be |
| 5 | MR. FELTHAM: | 5 | compensated and hence earn a return on its |
| 6 | Q. And I gather this kind of work, estimating a | 6 | equity investment over and above that risk- |
| 7 | benchmark ROE like this, this is not the | 7 | free asset. So, that's the starting point. |
| 8 | work of an actuary? It's not who typically | 8 | And you then sort of look at the actual |
| 9 | does that? | 9 | ofitability of that company, relate it to |
| 10 | LAZAR: | 10 | e sort of return of a market portfolio. |
| 11 | A. It's finance. This is sort of the area of | 11 | In Canada, you use the S\&P TSX. If you're |
| 12 | expertise of a Professor Prisman. I teach | 12 | doing the US, probably would use the S\&P. |
| 13 | this as well, but it's, you know, really the | 13 | So, you run a relationship to find out |
| 14 | workhorse of finance. Every first year | 14 | how risky is this particular company |
| 15 | finance course, this is how you determine | 15 | compared to the market in total and you |
| 16 | the risk profile of companies. This is how | 16 | estimate as a result what's called beta. |
| 17 | you determine what should be their target | 17 | That's an estimate of a risk profile. If |
| 18 | return on equity and that's get based - | 18 | this company is as risky as the market, the |
| 19 | built into what should be the weighted | 19 | beta will be equal to one which means that |
| 20 | average cost of capital for companies. | 20 | the return on equity should be that risk- |
| 21 | MR. FELTHAM: | 21 | free return plus what has been the excess |
| 22 | Q. And explain a little bit, if you could, | 22 | return of investing in a market portfolio of |
| 23 | and you know, I know it's pretty elementar | 23 | equities less that risk-free return. That's |
| 24 | but the capital asset pricing model, that's | 24 | your premium, your risk premium. If the |
| 25 | what was utilized in this case to come up | 25 | beta is less than one that means this |
|  | Page 46 |  | Page 48 |
| 1 | with what the appropriate target or | 1 | company's investment opportunities have |
| 2 | benchmark, whatever - | 2 | proven to be somewhat less risky than the |
| 3 | LAZAR: | 3 | market in total and therefore the risk that |
| 4 | A. Yes. | 4 | you add to the risk-free rate will be |
| 5 | MR. FELTHAM: | 5 | somewhat less than for the market as a |
| 6 | Q. - ROE ought to have been over time. Give us | 6 | whole. |
| 7 | a little overview of how that works. | 7 | R. FELTHAM: |
| 8 | LAZAR: | 8 | Q. And I'll take you through a little bit then |
| 9 | A. Essentially what you're trying to do for a | 9 | on the findings here, but before we get |
| 10 | company is a risk-free rate of return. | 10 | there, and I don't want to belabour this |
| 11 | That's usually taken as interest rate on | 11 | point too much, but I mean, I guess, why is |
| 12 | some government bond. It could be short | 12 | it important - why is it important to know |
| 13 | term government bond. It could be sort of a | 13 | the appropriate estimated target ROE versus |
| 14 | medium term government bond. But we find an | 14 | assuming one from 2005 is appropriate? |
| 15 | asset class that we can agree the return on | 15 | What's the pitfalls if we use that 2005 |
| 16 | that asset class has little risk. Never | 16 | figure? What do we run the risk of? |
| 17 | going to be a zero risk, but it's little | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | risk. It's almost impure risk. | 18 | A. The pitfalls, you could both ways. |
| 19 | Then the question becomes for a | 19 | Financial markets change, year to year, over |
| 20 | particular company. For a company's equity, | 20 | time, and the risk premium that you're |
| 21 | for example, what should be the return? | 21 | adding to that risk-free rate will also |
| 22 | Well, the return should be over time, the | 22 | vary, as will the risk-free rate. So, from |
| 23 | company should do better than that risk-free | 23 | a regular regulatory point of view, you want |
| 24 | return. If it can't be better, don't be in | 24 | to ensure that you're giving the companies |
| 25 |  | 25 | the opportunity to earn what's an |

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interest rates. So, that's a straight
forward calculation. Calculating the beta
requires having data on individual
companies, looking at their profitability
and what we call in economics and finance,
running the regression, running - using that
as your dependent variable and running that
against your independent variable which is
simply the realized return on a market
portfolio. So, you run that statistical
relationship. You come up with an estimate
of beta which is a measure of the risk,
riskiness of this particular line of
business in this province.
So again, straightforward procedure.
The Excel file has the ability to do this
type of statistical analysis. But what's
required, again, three pieces of
information. The data for companies, that's
what we relied on MSA to provide us with
that information. Some measure of the risk-
free rate, there are different
possibilities. According to Eli, the one
that we use is most appropriate and most
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| appropriate return on equity for their |  | interest rates. So, that's a straight |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| investment class. There'll be some | 2 | forward calculation. Calculating the beta |
| companies that'll do better. They're more | 3 | requires having data on individual |
| efficient. They do better on their | 4 | companies, looking at their profitability |
| investment portfolio. They get lucky on | 5 | and what we call in economics and finance, |
| their claims. Some will do poor. But what | 6 | running the regression, running - using that |
| you want to do is here's the average that | 7 | as your dependent variable and running that |
| you're going to use for the industry. That | 8 | against your independent variable which is |
| then sets a maximum for the premiums. What | 9 | simply the realized return on a market |
| the company has set, they can set lower | 10 | portfolio. So, you run that statistical |
| premiums for various reasons | 11 | relationship. You come up with an estimate |
| If financial markets are stable, | 12 | of beta which is a measure of the risk, |
| interest rates remain constant, the market's | 13 | riskiness of this particular line of |
| risk premium remains constant, using | 14 | business in this province. |
| historically determined return on equity for | 15 | So again, straightforward procedure. |
| regulatory purposes is fine. But since | 16 | The Excel file has the ability to do this |
| financial markets aren't stable, then it's | 17 | type of statistical analysis. But what's |
| appropriate to take these changes into | 18 | required, again, three pieces of |
| account. | 19 | information. The data for companies, that's |
| The work we did for FSCO, we argue | 20 | what we relied on MSA to provide us with |
| hat we don't want to change return on | 21 | that information. Some measure of the risk- |
| equity year to year because you get too much | 22 | free rate, there are different |
| variability in the markets. What you want | 23 | possibilities. According to Eli, the one |
| to do, our preferred suggestion for them -- | 24 | that we use is most appropriate and most |
|  | 25 |  |
| Page 50 |  | Page 52 |
| you know, we didn't have enough data here to | 1 | widely used and again it's derived from Bank |
| do it for Newfoundland and Labrador, but our | 2 | of Canada data. So, that's widely |
| preferred suggestion for them was to take a | 3 | available. And then a market return, the |
| ten-year rolling average. So, new year data | 4 | TSX, the S\&P TSX index with a return from |
| become available. You add that into your | 5 | year to year, again widely available. So, |
| average. You drop the data ten years ago. | 6 | those data there simply run that |
| That gives you more stability in that return | 7 | relationship to come up with an estimate of |
| on equity over time, but it also will allow | 8 | beta that we then use to determine the |
| that return on equity to track what is | 9 | return, what should be the return on equity |
| actually happening in financial markets. | 10 | for the individual companies and for the |
| FELTHAM: | 11 | industry as whole. |
| Q. And at the bottom of page 18, la | 12 | (10:15 a.m.) |
| paragraph, there you say "As noted in | 13 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| Appendix 2, there are three key variables | 14 | Q. And, Doctor, in that regard, if we go to |
| required to estimate the ROE", and I think | 15 | Table 11 on page 19, these are the results, |
| you've gone over those, "risk-free interest | 16 | I'll say, so you got the risk adjusted, what |
| rate, risk premium and an estimate of beta". | 17 | you've calculated the risk adjusted |
| And so, take us then through here the rest | 18 | competitive ROEs say, ought to have been, I |
| of your estimation process in this instance. | 19 | guess, for 2011 to 2016, and we've got |
| You've identified the key variables. | 20 | numbers from a low of 5.85 up as high as |
| DR. LAZAR: | 21 | 7.84-sorry, no, a low of 3.75 in 2016. I |
| A. Okay. So, the risk-free rate we basically | 22 | guess what strikes me about these is that |
| used sort of the average of the expected | 23 | none of them are 10. |
| spot rate going forward five years and we | 24 | DR. LAZAR: |
| can derive that from the term structure of | 25 | A. And one would not expect them to be 10. At |

the time 10 was set, you know, interest
rates were significantly higher than they
are at this time, and that would account for
the difference, you know, were interest
rates 3 or 4 percentage points higher,
that's all that would be required to get to
your 10 number. Most likely, they were.
The other factor, I think, was the beta that
was used was 1, ours was about .8, .83, so
that would tend to move the return on equity
somewhat lower, but the key driver was that
risk-free rate.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And so, I'm trying to explain this in a
simple manner, I guess, or summarize this in
a simple manner, but instead of utilizing a
10 percent figure, as a ROE in these years,
if we were looking at premium sufficiency
relative to rate inadequacies, instead of
using 10, you would say we should be using
these numbers?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Again, subject to the proviso I said before,
that our preference would have been if you
had historical data, do 10 -year rolling
1
Page 54
averages.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. Right.

DR. LAZAR:
A. When we did the work for FSCO, we had data
going back to about 1993, '94 so we could do
that. That's not the case here, but if you
take just a five-year average, six-year
average, six percent, that would have been
much more appropriate than a 10 percent number, that would be your starting point.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And if we go to the next page, page 20. And here this gets into the return on investment portion and I'll start at the top, you say, "The comparisons in Table 9"-which is, just for reference purposes, is back on page 15, you say, "The comparisons in Table 9 make it clear that Oliver Wyman's assumptions for ROI", return on investment, "are unrealistically low." And I guess I'm trying to break this down as much as I can. Why is the ROI important?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Again, that enters into trying to estimate
the profitability of these companies and it would factor into the rate setting process, again, familiar with what happens in Ontario and their ROI is a key variable in that rate determination process.
MR. FELTHAM:
Q. And why do you say Oliver Wyman's assumption on it were unrealistically low?

## DR. LAZAR:

A. Again, you know, we derive the ROIs from the GISA data, sort of at the aggregate industry level, and the reported returns on equity for the companies and we use equity as a proxy for sort of the reserves they had available. The reason we made that assumption, and that was the assumption built into FSCO's rate determination process, so we just sort of extrapolated it to the case in Newfoundland and Labrador, and the numbers generated from those aggregate data were well above the Oliver Wyman data. I think the difference and again, I haven't done any sort of detailed analysis, is that Oliver Wyman is using as returns dividends and interest cash
received. At the GISA data level, what's included there are capital gains and losses recorded from year to year. Mostly likely because that's required for tax purposes, and there is trading in these assets that's not a matter of they'll buy an asset and stick with it. And the gap tends to reflect the fact that most, if not all insurance companies, invest a significant part of that portfolio in equities and they do so because of the higher expected returns on equity over time and the capital gains to be received, that's why that earlier table looked at the returns on the market portfolio to look at how that's bounced around and the importance of that for the ROI calculations.

## MR. FELTHAM:

A. And below this paragraph at the top of page 20 , there are some more references, quotes from the Board's 2005 benchmark decision and I want to refer you to the sort of second paragraph, it begins with "The Board agrees with the evidence of Dr. Kalymond and Ms. McShane"-I gather they were experts

|  |  |  | Page 57 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | testifying in that hearing at the time. | 1 | Paula Elliott, who was here on behalf of |
| 2 | "The ROI should reflect to the extent | 2 | Oliver Wyman, the actuary, he asked her |
| 3 | possible the actual investment practices of | 3 | about that and both seemed to take issue |
| 4 | Canadian automobile insurers and should bear | 4 | with the notion of 6 percent being used by |
| 5 | an internal consistency to ROE in the | 5 | FSCO. Can you explain that? I mean, how |
| 6 | benchmarking process."So I gather you've | 6 | did that get in there? |
| 7 | directed us to that because that's what that | 7 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 8 | is telling us, it's the same thing. This is | 8 | A. |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| 1 | slightly above it, which will tend to be | 1 | A. |
| 2 | lower than what's currently in practice. | 2 | Yeah, but again, we have sort of a history |
| 3 | And that was an argument we also made with | 3 | of companies and industries that are |
| 4 | FSCO, they had used 25 percent for a long | 4 | overtaken by technology and, you know, it's |
| 5 | period of time and we asked them have you | 5 | one thing if that technology did not exist, |
| 6 | actually explored those practices? And they | 6 | was not developed, but it's quite a simple |
| 7 | said, yeah, we know there are companies that | 7 | matter to do a quick cost comparison of |
| 8 | do much better than that, but we haven't | 8 | insurance and it's a simple matter for, you |
| 9 | changed it. So that's the first, you know, | 9 | know, an uber type, amazon type platform to |
| 10 | you want to lower this to provide incentive | 10 | be created for consumers to be matched up |
| 11 | to become more efficient and those that are | 11 | with the lowest cost suppliers, taking into |
| 12 | extremely efficient will have a higher ROE, | 12 | (10:30 account that service element. |
| 13 | those that are less efficient, a lower ROE, | 13 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 14 | but that's what you want to do. The second | 14 | Q. |


|  | Page 65 | Page 67 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | should the premiums be over those expected | 1 | June of 2017. |
| 2 | claims? And it varies considerably, | 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 3 | depending on the assumptions, and I use some | 3 | Q. And how were you contacted? |
| 4 | assumptions with regards to the expense | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | ratio, return on investment, return on | 5 | A. I'm sorry, you will have to speak a little |
| 6 | equity, and what you get is premiums should | 6 | louder. |
| 7 | be anywhere from the low end assumptions, | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 8 | about 23 percent above the expected claims | 8 | Q. How were you contacted? |
| 9 | for the year, upwards to, I think 42 percent | 9 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 10 | higher. So depending on the sets of | 10 | A. I don't think it was Colin's, Colin's |
| 11 | assumptions, how you set the premiums, | 11 | colleague contacted I think Eli Prisman |
| 12 | there's a substantial differential. So if | 12 | initially and asked if he was interested in |
| 13 | you use more realistic assumptions, premiums | 13 | sort of trying the work that he and I had |
| 14 | are going to be set at a much lower ratio to | 14 | done for FSCO and the Ontario Trial Lawyers |
| 15 | claims expected than if you use the type of | 15 | Associate to explore, to examine the case in |
| 16 | assumptions that Oliver Wyman used. | 16 | Newfoundland and Labrador. |
| 17 | MR. FELTHAM: | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | Q. Thank you, Doctor. I don't have any | 18 | Q. Okay, and when did you actually become |
| 19 | additional questions and concludes the | 19 | engaged to do that very thing? |
| 20 | presentation portion, Madam Chair, and, | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | Doctor, there may be some questions for you | 21 | A. I think it was I that period, May, June. |
| 22 | from other parties. | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | Q. So you began to do-the paper we're looking |
| 24 | A. Pleasure to entertain them. | 24 | at here is dated July 2018? |
| 25 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: | 25 | DR. LAZAR: |
|  | Page 66 |  | Page 68 |
| 1 | Q. Madam Chair, Mr. Gittens advised me that he | 1 | A. Yes. |
| 2 | would have to leave at 10:00, so he won't be | 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 3 | asking any questions of Dr. Lazar. | 3 | Q. Are you saying you spent more than a year |
| 4 | CHAIR: | 4 | doing that? |
| 5 | Q. Okay. That's fine, thank you. Mr. Fraize, | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | I guess. | 6 | A. No. The original report was essentially |
| 7 | FRAIZE, Q.C.: | 7 | what would have been Sections 3 and 4, |
| 8 | Q. We have no questions. | 8 | whatever, and in this current report, let me |
| 9 | CHAIR: | 9 | just go back and be exact, my conclusions, |
| 10 | Q. Okay. Mr. Stamp. | 10 | referred to as Sections 2, 3, and 4 and then |
| 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 11 | Oliver Wyman's report was made public and we |
| 12 | Q. Dr. Lazar, just to clarify, can you tell me | 12 | were re-approached to examine that report |
| 13 | when you were engaged for this work, please? | 13 | and make comments on that. So the report |
| 14 | DR. LAZAR: | 14 | you have is essentially our original report, |
| 15 | A. Well the exact date? | 15 | including the section of our commentary on |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | the Oliver Wyman report. |
| 17 | Q. If you have that. | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 | Q. All right, so when you say Sections, 2, 3, |
| 19 | A. Well if you bear with me, I'll open up this | 19 | 4, I'm just trying to make sure I'm clear, |
| 20 | file and try to get some sense of this. It | 20 | what are Sections 2, 3, 4 in this report? |
| 21 | appears sometime June-May of 2017. | 21 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | A. Yeah, here it's just looking at the ROEs for |
| 23 | Q. Did you say June or May of 2017? | 23 | auto insurance companies in the province, |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | looking at - |
| 25 | A. It appears to be based on this file, May, | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |



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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Lazar? | 1 | included for the calculation and the |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 | differences were for the higher limit we |
| 3 | A. It would probably have to be, what's the | 3 | excluded, not only the TD subsidiaries, but |
| 4 | date of the Oliver Wyman report? Oliver | 4 | I think there were three other companies |
| 5 | Wyman report is March 29th, so it was | 5 | that were excluded, personal insurance, I |
| 6 | probably sometime in April. | 6 | think Intact and there was there another |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 | one? I believe that's it, yes. |
| 8 | Q. Okay, and so you had between April, sometime | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | and April you were contacted, you think, do | 9 | Q. And if you looked at the upper limit, what |
| 10 | you know when that was? | 10 | was the lower limit? |
| 11 | LAZAR: | 11 | R. LAZAR: |
| 12 | A. When exactly in A | 12 | A. The lower limit - |
| 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 13 | AMP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | Q. Yes. | 14 | Q. For comparison to 54 to 91 being the upper |
| 15 | DR. LAZAR: | 15 | limit, what would be the lower limit? |
| 16 | A. I'm just going by some of these dates here, | 16 | R. LAZAR: |
| 17 | all I can say is sometime early April. | 17 | A. The lower limit would be from zero upwards, |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | the only way we could ever determine the |
| 19 | Q. And then your report is dated July, when was | 19 | actual number, as I said before, is if we |
| 20 | it actually submitted? What date in July? | 20 | knew what the premiums that were permissible |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 | aggregated overall companies were in each |
| 22 | A. The report, I think | 22 | year, and what the premiums could have been |
| 23 | thereabouts, again just going by the dates | 23 | using different sets of assumptions. |
| 24 | that I have here. | 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 25 | Q. On that very point that premiums that are |
|  | Page 74 |  | Page 76 |
| 1 | Q. So should I take it from this that you spent | 1 | permitted each year, did you make any |
| 2 | about three months doing the report? | 2 | inquiry of the Public Utilities Board to |
| 3 | DR. LAZAR: | 3 | determine what premiums were permitted? |
| 4 | A. No. | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 5 | A. No. |
| 6 | Q. Okay, how long? | 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | DR. LAZAR: | 7 | Q. Why didn't you do that? |
| 8 | A. How long? It was over that period of time, | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | but I don't know the exact number of days. | 9 | A. Just using public data, we weren't going |
| 10 | Five days, eight days, over that period of | 10 | into any sort of detailed analysis. Our |
| 11 | time, somewhere in that range. | 11 | original, sort of, position was to look at |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | the return on equity, what should it have |
| 13 | Q. All right. In your report you suggest that, | 13 | been. A second was to look at the |
| 14 | and I'm not sure if I-I will try and locate | 14 | reasonableness of the expense ratios. |
| 15 | the exact - in your report and you spoke about | 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 16 | this this morning, you estimated premium | 16 | Q. Yes, I know, I got that. |
| 17 | overpayment and you referred to the 92,54 | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | to 92 you said was the upper limit? | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 20 | A. Yes. | 20 | Q. I heard that. I'm trying to understand why |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 | you didn't look at available data the Public |
| 22 | Q. 54 to 92 as an upper limit. Why is there | 22 | Utilities - |
| 23 | such a significant range in the upper limit? | 23 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | A. Okay, I - |
| 25 | A. It's a function of what companies were | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Q. - Board has all the rates available that are | 1 | the top line and more companies in the |
| 2 | approved for insurers, you didn't choose to | 2 | bottom line, is your-if what is done here is |
| 3 | look at that? | 3 | added 15 and 9 and 3 and 26? |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | A. No, because again, we were studying from a | 5 | A. Yes. |
| 6 | different, not mandate, but a different sort | 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | of approach. Even if we had looked at it, | 7 | Q. To 54? |
| 8 | we would then still have had to go back to | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | the regulator and say, okay now for each of | 9 | A. Yes. |
| 10 | these insurance companies tell us what were | 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 11 | their expected claims year by year. And | 11 | Q. And added 42 and 19 and 6 and 24 to 92? |
| 12 | then we could come up with an estimate of | 12 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 13 | what would be more reasonable permitted | 13 | A. Correct. |
| 14 | premiums. That, I think, is a task for the | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | Board to do or to decide whether they want | 15 | Q. Right. Now, you also said-I just want to |
| 16 | that done to come up with an accurate | 16 | try and find this for you. I can't put my |
| 17 | measure. | 17 | fingers right on it, but my recollection, |
| 18 | (10:45 a.m.) | 18 | Mr. Lazar, was that you said, there were |
| 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 19 | significant losses in '14 and '15. |
| 20 | Q. You talked about companies shifting income - | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 | A. Yes. |
| 22 | A. Yes. | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | STAMP, Q.C | 23 | Q. I think you said the profits-when profits |
| 24 | Q. to the most favourable locat | 24 | eroded substantially, I think you might have |
| 25 | companies have an obligation to pay taxes in | 25 | said, in ' $14 /{ }^{\prime} 15$. |
|  | Page 78 |  | Page 80 |
| 1 | this jurisdiction, for example, that's a | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | legal obligation, is it not? | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | DR. LAZAR: | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | A. That's legal, but you still have flexibility | 4 | Q. Were the profits in ' $14 /$ ' 15 that would go |
| 5 | with regards to how you allocate | 5 | into Table 17 negative? |
| 6 | expenditures. | 6 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 | A. They weren't included in Table 17. |
| 8 | Q. So, you're not asserting that somebody has, | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | sort of, cheated one province or another. | 9 | Q. No, that's what I'm wondering; where are |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 | they? |
| 11 | A. I made it clear at the outset that transfer | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | pricing is legal. There are limitations | 12 | A. I just ignored them. I was asked to redo |
| 13 | imposed and companies would fully take | 13 | this, taking those into account. |
| 14 | advantage of the rules to minimize their tax | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | liabilities. They're not doing anything | 15 | Q. Taking, asked to take what into account? |
| 16 | illegal. It's all legal; it's all | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | permissible. | 17 | A. The negative results in 2014/2015 and if |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | they're negative results, the argument that |
| 19 | Q. Okay. I want to come back to your table 17, | 19 | was posed to me was well, does that mean |
| 20 | it's at page 29 of your report. | 20 | that there were premium underpayment and |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 | shouldn't that be factored out? That was |
| 22 | A. Yes. | 22 | the presumption and I reported to that |
| 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 23 | question and said okay, I'm quite happy to |
| 24 | Q. So, do I understand that's what's happened | 24 | throw them in here are the results. |
| 25 | here is that you took certain companies in | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Q. Okay, I'm confused. We got to back up a | 1 | one can then - |
| 2 | bit. You said somebody asked you to take | 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 3 | them out? | 3 | Q. Negative twenty one million? |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | A. No, no. Someone asked, posed a question to | 5 | A. Negative twenty one million. |
| 6 | Eli and myself, okay, you didn't include | 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | those negative results. Shouldn't you have | 7 | Q. In which line? |
| 8 | included them to refine your estimates of | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | the upper limit of the premium overpayments | 9 | A. 2014/2015. |
| 10 | assuming that if there were these losses | 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 11 | that therefore there were premium | 11 | Q. Which line of 2014/'15? |
| 12 | underpayments and that should have been | 12 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 13 | deducted from the premium overpayments to | 13 | A. All excluding Primmum and Security National. |
| 14 | come up with a more reasonable number? That | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | question was posed to us and we responded | 15 | Q. Twenty one, twenty one million? |
| 16 | and said, that's fine, we'll throw these in | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | and we'll show you what the numbers are and | 17 | A. Yes. |
| 18 | you can judge what that means for you, but | 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 19 | I'll have a different position on that. | 19 | Q. Negative? |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | Q. Where are | 21 | A. Yes. And then the question becomes, does |
| 22 | DR. LAZAR: | 22 | this reflect premium underpayments? |
| 23 | A. In a response to questions submitted by the | 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 24 | Public Utilities Board, I'm not sure if it | 24 | Q. Well, it affects a poor result in '11, '12, |
| 25 | was the Board that asked that question or if | 25 | ' 13 and ' 16 , does it not? |
|  | Page 82 |  | Page 84 |
| 1 | it was your organization that asked the | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | question. We responded and submitted those | 2 | A. Yes, however, as I pointed out, the complete |
| 3 | to Colin and I just presumed that he | 3 | analysis would have been here are the |
| 4 | forwarded them to everybody who is | 4 | premiums and aggregate that were permitted. |
| 5 | participating here. | 5 | Here are the premiums that should or could |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | have been permitted under different set of |
| 7 | Q. Sure, and so for ' $14 /$ ' 15 , if you have | 7 | assumptions. ROE assumptions, expense |
| 8 | plugged in numbers in both lines, all | 8 | assumptions, ROI assumptions. And you take |
| 9 | excluding Primmum and Security National - | 9 | that differential which means in 2014/2105 |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 | it still would have been a positive number. |
| 11 | A. Yeah. | 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | Q. Hold on a second now. When you did 2011, |
| 13 | Q. - and then the second line, all positive | 13 | did you use a number that actually occurred, |
| 14 | ROEs, if you'd plug numbers in there for | 14 | you say - |
| 15 | those two years, for those two groupings, | 15 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 16 | what would the numbers be? | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | A. The resulting total over the period? | 18 | Q. - a number that-is it a number that you |
| 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 19 | created or that's published somewhere? |
| 20 | Q. No, the numbers for '14 and the numbers for | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | ' 15. | 21 | A. That number, that's a number we created. We |
| 22 | DR. LAZAR: | 22 | took the actual performance and we compared |
| 23 | A. Okay. Roughly, again slightly different | 23 | it to what would have been a more |
| 24 | methodology, but the numbers will be | 24 | appropriate ROE for that year. |
| 25 | reasonable, $-21,000,000$ by both years and | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Q. Right, okay, so you took your theory of | 1 | what your similar approach would have been |
| 2 | what's more appropriate and generated a | 2 | for '14 rather than leave it blank? |
| 3 | number for 2011 of 15.4 , is that right? | 3 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | A. Because our arguments would be that the |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 | losses that were incurred might have been |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | the result of misestimating, misjudging the |
| 7 | Q. And you did the same for ' 12 and so on? | 7 | actual realized claims for the year, might |
| 8 | DR. LAZAR: | 8 | have been the result of competitive pricing. |
| 9 | A. Correct. | 9 | There may have been a whole host of other |
| 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 10 | factors that drove those losses. These are |
| 1 | Q. And when you took your appropriate approach | 11 | ex-post losses compared to what was |
| 12 | on '14, what did you get? | 12 | anticipated at the beginning of that period. |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | A. When you're referring to appropriate | 14 | Q. But everybody anticipates at the start of |
| 15 | approach - | 15 | the period, I guess, that they're going to |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | make some money. |
| 17 | Q. No, I don't think it's appropriate. I'm | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | saying it's your approach. | 18 | A. Yes, that's the essence of risk. |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 20 | A. Okay, which one are you referring to? | 20 | Q. Sure. But I got to tell you, Mr. Lazar, you |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 | got me baffled because I'm looking at this |
| 22 | Q. The one that gave you 15.4. | 22 | and saying, okay, you leave out some years |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | because it could be explained by some bit of |
| 24 | A. For that, again since the gap was negative, | 24 | back luck and planets lined up badly. This |
| 25 | we just zeroed it out. | 25 | is what would have happened, but you don't |
|  | Page 86 |  | Page 88 |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 | tell me the numbers. |
| 2 | Q. Hold on now. You used an approach you told | 2 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 3 | me. | 3 | A. We did present the numbers in response to |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | the question. |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | Q. Can I ask you to take a look at your, I |
| 7 | Q. I want to understand this. You used an | 7 | guess these came from you, responses to |
| 8 | approach to get 15.4. | 8 | questions submitted by Public Utilities |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | Board. |
| 10 | A. Okay, let me backtrack. | 10 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 11 | A. Yes. The numbers are there. |
| 12 | Q. Sure. | 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 | Q. Okay. Do you have that? I don't know if |
| 14 | A. When the gap between the actual ROE and our | 14 | you have that up there. |
| 15 | estimate of what would be an appropriate | 15 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 16 | ROE, again subject to the fact that we're | 16 | A. I have it. |
| 17 | using annual numbers rather than a moving | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | average, when the gap was positive, that | 18 | Q. Thank you, okay. So, tell me, the question |
| 19 | produced an estimate of an upper range for | 19 | I guess-I can probably get the questions for |
| 20 | possible premium overpayments. When the gap | 20 | you too so that we won't be confused, just |
| 21 | was negative, which was the case in | 21 | give me a second there. |
| 22 | 2014/2015, we just zeroed it out. We did | 22 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 23 | not include that. | 23 | A. What you're suggesting is, if we throw those |
| 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 24 | in, that gives a better estimate, possibly |
| 25 | Q. But why did you zero it out? Why not show | 25 | of premium overpayments over the entire |


|  | Page 89 |  | $\text { Page } 91$ <br> anything to this hearing. Comments like |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | period. | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 2 |  | that-Dr. Lazar is answering the questions, |
| 3 | Q. Mr. Lazar, the Public Utilities Board | 3 |  | the questions are being put to him. They |
| 4 | question number 6 was this, "Please explain | 4 |  | could have had their own expert and we will |
| 5 | why the years 2014 and 2015 are left blank | 5 |  | be arguing this in our submissions. |
| 6 | in Table 16, 17 and '18'? And your answer | 6 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 7 | which was on the board a moment ago-I'm | 7 | Q. | The point, Madam Chair, of course is Mr. |
| 8 | sorry we just shifted off that again, but | 8 |  | Lazar has prepared this report, we're |
| 9 | your answer was there. | 9 |  | looking for clarification, that's the |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 |  | purpose of the questions, to inform the |
| 11 | A. Because the gap was negative. | 11 |  | Board on Mr. Lazar's report and any |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 |  | questions that arise out of that report. |
| 13 | Q. Yeah, your answer--sorry, just to come back | 13 |  | We've done the same thing. I mean, all the |
| 14 | to your answer--is "the years 2014 and '15 | 14 |  | questions that were put to Oliver Wyman, |
| 15 | are left blank because in both years the | 15 |  | there were tonnes of questions of the same |
| 16 | aggregate ROEs were negative and thus | 16 |  | sort, explain this and explain that. |
| 17 | obviously below our estimates of appropriate | 17 |  | There's nothing different happening here at |
| 18 | ROEs for this industry in Newfoundland and | 18 |  | all with Mr. Lazar and I'm just trying to |
| 19 | Labrador". So, where are the numbers? You | 19 |  | understand it. |
| 20 | said you gave the numbers, where are the | 20 |  | AZAR: |
| 21 | numbers? | 21 | A. | Oh no, I have no problem with your |
| 22 | DR. LAZAR: | 22 |  | questions. |
| 23 | A. They're in point 7 on that same document. | 23 |  | NEDY, Q.C.: |
| 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 24 | Q. | It's the gratuitous comments that I have-the |
| 25 | Q. Is that "ROE gaps" that you're talking | 25 |  | commentary "I don't understand", "I'm not |
|  | Page 90 |  |  | Page 92 |
| 1 | about? | 1 |  | clear", that's not the purpose of |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 |  | questioning, ask a question and you'll get |
| 3 | A. Yes, yes. | 3 |  | an answer, can you explain a little bit |
| 4 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 4 |  | further" but we've seen this now for two |
| 5 | Q. So, when you said 21,000,000 - | 5 |  | days with gratuitous comments that I would |
| 6 | DR. LAZAR: | 6 |  | suggest, sir, is not appropriate. It's not |
| 7 | A. That's point 8 . | 7 |  | the way it should be conducted, the |
| 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 8 |  | questions should be conducted. It's |
| 9 | Q. Hold on now, I'm trying to understand. | 9 |  | disparaging to the witness, "I'm not clear", |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 |  | "I don't understand". |
| 11 | A. I thought it was clear in what we did and | 11 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 12 | how we responded. | 12 | Q. | And I don't. |
| 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 13 |  | EDY, Q.C.: |
| 14 | Q. Not to me. | 14 | Q. | Well that's your problem, Mr. Stamp. You |
| 15 | DR. LAZAR: | 15 |  | could have obtained an expert witness, you |
| 16 | A. Sorry. | 16 |  | chose not to do that, you choose to rely on |
| 17 | KENNEDY, Q.C.: | 17 |  | Oliver Wyman, fair enough, that's the way |
| 18 | Q. I think it should be pointed out, Chair, and | 18 |  | this works out. So I'm suggesting, Madam |
| 19 | it will be pointed out to members of the | 19 |  | Chair, we saw it yesterday with the attack |
| 20 | Board later, Mr. Stamp has had this report, | 20 |  | on the people from Ontario and I don't think |
| 21 | IBC has had this report for quite some time. | 21 |  | this thing can deteriorate to that same kind |
| 22 | They could have had their own expert, they | 22 |  | of questioning today, that's what I'm asking |
| 23 | could have brought expert evidence. I | 23 |  | you to stop. |
| 24 | don't' think the commentary, the gratuitous | 24 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 25 | commentary "it's not clear to me" adds | 25 | Q. | Madam Chair, Mr. Lazar was asked about the |


|  | Page 93 |  | Page 95 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | gap in his Table No. 17, and he's explained | 1 | when I was asking what numbers would have |
| 2 | in some fashion why that gap exists. He | 2 | gone into the lines on 14 and 15 of Table |
| 3 | said he provided the numbers in answers to | 3 | 17, I thought you had told me the top line? |
| 4 | either IBC or the Public Utilities Board. | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | So I got the questions and I've read the | 5 | A. No, it's again to be equivalent the first, |
| 6 | question into the record from the Public | 6 | well the second row there is all excluding |
| 7 | Utilities Board, Question No. 6, and I've | 7 | Primmum and Security National. This is |
| 8 | asked-because the answer to Question No. 6 | 8 | where the minus 21 million comes in. |
| 9 | is contained in the Answer No. 6 in the | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | response, but the numbers that were asked | 10 | Q. Okay. |
| 11 | for by the Public Utilities Board are not | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | given in No. 6. Now I think Mr. Lazar had | 12 | A. Second is all positive ROEs where it's |
| 13 | explained to us they're in maybe 7 or 8, I'm | 13 | approximately minus 20 million. |
| 14 | going to just try and clarify that because | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | that's where my confusion lies. | 15 | Q. So if you included those minus, for example |
| 16 | CHAIR: | 16 | all companies is minus 61 million. |
| 17 | Q. Just ask your question. | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | A. Okay, now I want to point out that in |
| 19 | Q. Sure. So, are the numbers for 14 and 15, | 19 | responding we did just a short cut, just |
| 20 | Mr. Lazar, that would have gone into Table | 20 | took the gap, multiplied it by the equity. |
| 21 | 17, which were asked for by the Public | 21 | For the report, we did an iterative process, |
| 22 | Utilities Board, where are they please? | 22 | the only reason we did the short cut here |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | was just time constraints. If you compare |
| 24 | A. They're in Point 9. | 24 | the results in the response Point 8 to our |
| 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 25 | Table 17, what you find is the iterative |
|  | Page 94 |  | Page 96 |
| 1 | Q. And they're percentages, are they? | 1 | process actually produced larger estimates |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 | of the overpayments. |
| 3 | A. Sorry? | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 4 | Q. So when I look at your answer No. 8. |
| 5 | Q. Are Point 9 percentages? | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | DR. LAZAR: | 6 | A. Yes. |
| 7 | A. Oh, sorry, Point 8. | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 8 | Q. Looked at the question, but the answer, |
| 9 | Q. Point 8 has the numbers? | 9 | because this is what you're explaining to |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 | me, is that the total 11 through 16, all |
| 11 | A. Yes, sorry about that. | 11 | excluding Primmum and National Security and |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | all companies, it's just that those two-the |
| 13 | Q. Okay, so Point 8 is dollar amounts? | 13 | two things are flipped around from the Table |
| 14 | DR. LAZAR: | 14 | 17. Table 17 has all positive ROEs on the |
| 15 | A. Yes. Point 9 is percentage amounts, as you | 15 | bottom and you have all companies on the top |
| 16 | correctly pointed out. | 16 | in this table at No. 8, is that right? |
| 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | Q. Right, and so the 14 number is minus 29 | 18 | A. Is that first row, all companies, is nowhere |
| 19 | million now? | 19 | in Table 17. |
| 20 | DR. LAZAR: | 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 21 | A. No, the one that is comparable to Table 17 | 21 | Q. Okay. |
| 22 | in our report is 21 million, minus 21 | 22 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 23 | million number. | 23 | A. Only the next two rows are the equivalent to |
| 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 24 | what's in Table 17. |
| 25 | Q. I thought-and you can clarify this for me, | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |


| Q. Which two rows, I'm sorry? Page 97 |  |  | Pecause we use a simple methodology for the 99 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 |  |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 | responses as compared to the more |
| 3 | A. The last two rows. Would it be easier if I | 3 | appropriate iterative methodology in our |
| 4 | just came there and pointed it out? I mean, | 4 | report. |
| 5 | I'm sorry, I just can't make it any clearer. | 5 | CHAIR: |
| 6 | I'm not sure what the confusion is. | 6 | Q. Mr. Stamp, might this be a good time for us |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 | to take a break? |
| 8 | Q. Well when I look at Table 17, all positive | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | ROEs. | 9 | Q. Yes, Madam Chair. |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 | (BREAK - 11:06 a.m.) |
| 11 | A. Yes. That is the equivalent of the last row | 11 | (RESUME - 11:36 a.m.) |
| 12 | in our Point 8. | 12 | CHAIR: |
| 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 13 | Q. Back to you, Mr. Stamp. |
| 14 | Q. Right, which is 92 million, the total 92 | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | million? | 15 | Q. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Lazar, I'm just |
| 16 | DR. LAZAR: | 16 | going to go back to your Table 17 in your |
| 17 | A. Yes. | 17 | report for a moment, at page 29. |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 19 | Q. And that becomes 2 million? | 19 | A. Okay. |
| 20 | DR. LAZAR: | 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 21 | A. No, it becomes 35. | 21 | Q. I want to note for a moment, the top line |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | "All except"-I guess-"Primmum and Security |
| 23 | Q. I'm sorry, in - | 23 | National", do you see 15.4, 9.5, 3.4 and |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | then two spaces and the 26 and 54. And if I |
| 25 | A. You have got to compare the same groupings. | 25 | can now turn to the answers or responses to |
|  | Page 98 |  | Page 100 |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 | the questions from Public Utilities Board |
| 2 | Q. Where do I find 35 in the-Oh, over here, | 2 | and at page, there's no page number, I'm |
| 3 | over in the other positive ROEs. | 3 | sorry, answer Number 8, I guess, at the |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | bottom of the page. Yeah, that's right |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 | there, that's fine. Do you have that Mr. |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | Lazar? |
| 7 | Q. I see. Okay, so there's all companies and | 7 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 8 | all positive ROEs. | 8 | A. Yes. |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | A. And the number in Point 8, the 35 million, | 10 | Q. Now, you don't have the other numbers in |
| 11 | if we had used the same methodology we used | 11 | front of you again, but if you need, I can - |
| 12 | in the report, that number would actually be | 12 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 13 | higher, approximately about $15-20$ percent | 13 | A. Which table were you - |
| 14 | higher. | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 15 | Q. The bottom of-it's marked Number 8. |
| 16 | Q. So, this in this response you gave to the | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | Public Utilities Board, the 54 million in | 17 | A. No, no, what was the table in the report you |
| 18 | Table 17 becomes two in estimated, in Number | 18 | referred to? |
| 19 | 8 answer. | 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 20 | DR. LAZAR: | 20 | Q. Seventeen. |
| 21 | A. Yes, but again - | 21 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | A. Okay, I've got that here. |
| 23 | Q. And the 92 becomes 34. | 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | Q. So, what I'm noting is that the line for |
| 25 | A. But both of those are underestimated | 25 | "all excluding Primmum and Security |


|  | Page 101 | Page 103 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | National" in the table, in response Number 8 | 1 | A. | No, the premium is part of the-two parts of |
| 2 | puts numbers in there, of course, 21 million | 2 |  | it. I believe there's legal obligation to |
| 3 | or -20.7 or whatever, -20.7 and 20.7. | 3 |  | hold a certain amount of reserves against |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 |  | future claims. And the premiums provide the |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 |  | claims will be paid in the future. You |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 |  | going to have net of your expenses some cash |
| 7 | Q. But why have you changed the other numbers | 7 |  | available to you for a period of time that |
| 8 | as well? | 8 |  | you can that you can invest. |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 10 | A. Okay, as I explained, there are two possible | 10 | Q. | So, reserves for the purposes of this, when |
| 11 | approaches. The simple approach which is | 11 |  | you made this comment, reserves are |
| 12 | what was used for Point 8 here in the | 12 |  | essentially equity that's maintained in the |
| 13 | response was to simply take the gap, the | 13 |  | company? |
| 14 | difference between the actual ROE and/or | 14 |  | AZAR: |
| 15 | estimate of what should be an acceptable ROE | 15 | A. | We equated it to primarily because of the |
| 16 | and multiply that times the total equity. | 16 |  | work we did with FSCO where they simply used |
| 17 | So, that's the methodology, the simple | 17 |  | the particular ratio of premium to equity |
| 18 | methodology that we employed in the | 18 |  | which FSCO claimed and we have no reason to |
| 19 | response, less time consuming. | 19 |  | question them on this, they said was a |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 |  | measure of, sort of, the reserves, the |
| 21 | Q. Okay. | 21 |  | investable funds that the companies had. |
| 22 | DR. LAZAR: | 22 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 23 | A. In the report, we went through an iterative | 23 | Q. | But when I asked you what reserves were, I |
| 24 | process because once you start making | 24 |  | thought you said it's the amount retained to |
| 25 | adjustments for differences in equity, you | 25 |  | provide protection for claims. Did you say |
|  | Page 102 |  |  | Page 104 |
| 1 | have to factor that back into return on | 1 |  | that - |
| 2 | investment, et cetera. So, we use the more, | 2 |  | AZAR: |
| 3 | sort of, complicated with more appropriate | 3 | A. | For future claims, yes. |
| 4 | approach in the report than we did in the | 4 |  | MP, Q.C.: |
| 5 | response. And again, the only reason we did | 5 | Q. | Future claims, yes. And so that's the-is it |
| 6 | that for the response was to save time. | 6 |  | essentially the equity in the company? |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 |  | AZAR: |
| 8 | Q. Okay. I want to just come back to your | 8 | A. | We use them as being equivalent. |
| 9 | evidence earlier today. At one point you | 9 |  | MP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | said, and hopefully I got this generally | 10 | Q. | That may be, but essentially is what you're |
| 11 | accurately recorded, reserves are invested | 11 |  | referring to, essentially is the equity in |
| 12 | by insurers and it's a major driver of | 12 |  | the company. |
| 13 | profitability. Now, I may not have that | 13 |  | AZAR: |
| 14 | exactly right, but something to that effect. | 14 | A. | The equity committed for this line of |
| 15 | DR. LAZAR: | 15 |  | business. |
| 16 | A. Yes. | 16 |  | MP, Q.C.: |
| 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 17 | Q. | Right. And would that be all the equity in |
| 18 | Q. And what are reserves? | 18 |  | the company or limited amount of equity? |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 |  | AZAR: |
| 20 | A. The reserves that have to hold against | 20 | A. | Again, we used it as the entire equity |
| 21 | future claims. | 21 |  | committed to this line of business in this |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 |  | province. |
| 23 | Q. And so is that-that's not the premium for | 23 |  | MP, Q.C.: |
| 24 | investment, is it? | 24 | Q. | Okay. Now, you also spoke about reserves, I |
| 25 | DR. LAZAR: | 25 |  | think, in a different context. You said, |


|  | Page 105 | Page 107 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | most if not all insurers invest significant | 1 |  | can get past some of this complication. Mr. |
| 2 | part of reserves in equity. Do you recall | 2 |  | Lazar came this morning and he testified |
| 3 | that discussion? | 3 |  | that more, if not all insurers invest |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 |  | significant part of reserves in equity. |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 |  | Now, I don't know where that would be in |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 |  | this report. I haven't seen it and so he's |
| 7 | Q. And so when you speak that way, are you | 7 |  | testified or spoken about or presented it as |
| 8 | speaking about the same reserves that you | 8 |  | part of this information this morning. I'm |
| 9 | spoke about earlier? | 9 |  | happy to let that go in, but I'm happy to |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 |  | question him about it as well. I can't |
| 11 | A. Yes. | 11 |  | anticipate what he will say and come armed |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 |  | with a library. I had to come and listen to |
| 13 | Q. Okay. And what part, you say a significant | 13 |  | Mr. Lazar give his presentation and then ask |
| 14 | part, what part does each insurer invest? | 14 |  | him about that presentation. This is just |
| 15 | DR. LAZAR: | 15 |  | one aspect of that presentation. |
| 16 | A. I don't know. | 16 |  | a.m.) |
| 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 17 |  | ELTHAM: |
| 18 | Q. But you said it was significant. | 18 | Q. | Madam Chair, it's not library. He's the one |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 |  | who is bringing up the document and |
| 20 | A. If you'll look at the returns they've | 20 |  | referring to it. It's an IBC document. It |
| 21 | generated on their investments and | 21 |  | would be so difficult to provide that |
| 22 | essentially on this pool of funds, then you | 22 |  | document in advance, if he's going to |
| 23 | know, you compare it to returns on investing | 23 |  | question the witness about it. |
| 24 | in a bond portfolio, one can infer from that | 24 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 25 | as we did, that there has to be, don't know | 25 | Q. | Madam Chair, I didn't hear the comment until |
|  | Page 106 |  |  | Page 108 |
| 1 | what the number is, 40,50 percent on | 1 |  | I heard Mr. Lazar speak. I didn't come |
| 2 | average that might be invested in equities | 2 |  | with, you know, all the GISA and FSCO and |
| 3 | in order to generate those returns. | 3 |  | IBC documentation in my back pocket. I |
| 4 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 4 |  | can't do that. I listened to Mr. Lazar |
| 5 | Q. I just noticed that one of the pieces of | 5 |  | explain what he thought was the investment, |
| 6 | information that IBC has on their-they have | 6 |  | I don't know, agenda or style for P\&C |
| 7 | a facts book which records or discloses how | 7 |  | insurers and said that a significant part |
| 8 | insurers, P \& C insurers invest-how they | 8 |  | and I think he went on to say, I don't know |
| 9 | actually-what they invest in. And the | 9 |  | if he said 40 percent. I'm sorry, Mr. |
| 10 | investment on the equity side, this is I | 10 |  | Lazar, I can't remember what you said there, |
| 11 | think part of the data is from MSA and I | 11 |  | significant part, 40 percent maybe I think |
| 12 | think some from Provincial authorities. | 12 |  | he said and according to the IBC and |
| 13 | That investment in shares which I take it to | 13 |  | information I've just been passed, it's more |
| 14 | be equities is 11.2 percent as of the end of | 14 |  | like 11.1 or 2 or whatever I said that |
| 15 | the December 2017. | 15 |  | percent I said was. |
| 16 | MR. FELTHAM: | 16 |  |  |
| 17 | Q. Madam Chair, Mr. Stamp is-we've had this | 17 | Q. | Yes, yes - |
| 18 | theme reoccurring here. Again, we're | 18 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 19 | referring to documentation which hasn't been | 19 | Q. | So, I can't come-my friend is critical of me |
| 20 | provided to the Board, hasn't been provided | 20 |  | not coming with information. I can't come |
| 21 | to the parties, that witness has not had an | 21 |  | with that information. I can only try to |
| 22 | opportunity to review what he's being | 22 |  | deal with it as it arises. |
| 23 | referred to. It's very unfair. | 23 |  |  |
| 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 24 | Q. | I agree, Mr. Stamp. When information arises |
| 25 | Q. Madam Chair, let me just try and see if we | 25 |  | in the course of cross-examination I |


|  | Page 109 |  | Page 111 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | appreciate that information is not in the | 1 | that operate only in Newfoundland and |
| 2 | report. It would be helpful to the Board | 2 | Labrador. |
| 3 | though if you're referring to something | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | that's different than what Mr. Lazar would | 4 | Q. I don't think so. |
| 5 | have said to put it on the record. | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | A. Could be plus or minus for that. You don't |
| 7 | Q. Madam Chair, yes, what I can do is I can | 7 | have those data? Okay, so my, sort of, |
| 8 | tell you, if you can just-I can ask what | 8 | question, my comment then, if you look at my |
| 9 | that document actually is so Mr. Lazar can | 9 | Table 14 in my report, where I compare the |
| 10 | then refer to it if he wishes or - | 10 | S\&P TSX Annual Return and Net Investment |
| 11 | CHAIR: | 11 | Return on Equity for the Auto Insurance |
| 12 | Q. Well, it's going to be difficult for him to | 12 | Companies in Labrador and Newfoundland, |
| 13 | refer to it now, so. | 13 | assuming it's 89 percent in bonds, 11 |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 14 | percent in equities. Now, of course the 89 |
| 15 | Q. Yes, I know. It is a- | 15 | percent, it could be another asset |
| 16 | CHAIR: | 16 | (phonetic) classes. You know, Eli and I can |
| 17 | Q. Can you just make a copy of the - | 17 | sort of do quick calculations what the |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | returns on a bond portfolio would be and at |
| 19 | Q. Well, I can send - maybe I could just send | 19 | 89 percent, 11 percent split, you're not |
| 20 | that information to maybe Ms. Glynn or | 20 | going to get numbers anywhere near this. |
| 21 | somebody and it could get printed or | 21 | The returns on a bond portfolio were simply |
| 22 | something. Is that possible? Can you send | 22 | too low given that 89 percent weight to |
| 23 | that to-one page? Does that explain where | 23 | generate these types of returns. So, that's |
| 24 | it came from? We'll do our best, Madam | 24 | why when I said "significant", I'm looking |
| 25 | Chair to - | 25 | at these numbers. I know what happened to |
|  | Page 110 |  | Page 112 |
| 1 | CHAIR: | 1 | interest rates over this period of time, so |
| 2 | Q. Yes, well, it would have to put on the | 2 | there was no much capital appreciation. The |
| 3 | record for us to be able to take note of it | 3 | yields on them are quite low and, you know, |
| 4 | in any event. | 4 | applying 89 percent to that 11 percent to |
| 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 5 | the rest, you're going to get investment |
| 6 | Q. That's fine, sure. We'll let that unfold | 6 | returns on equity that are significantly |
| 7 | and I'll come on to - | 7 | lower than these reported numbers. So, |
| 8 | DR. LAZAR: | 8 | those numbers might be interesting, I would |
| 9 | A. Can I just ask one thing and then you can | 9 | question them, and in particular how |
| 10 | comment? The 11 percent, that's for all $\mathrm{P} \& \mathrm{C}$ | 10 | appropriate are they for the auto insurance |
| 11 | companies in Canada? | 11 | companies operating in this province? |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 13 | Q. I gather so. | 13 | Q. So, on that point, Mr. Lazar, where did you |
| 14 | DR. LAZAR: | 14 | get 12.12, is that your number? |
| 15 | A. And what time period? | 15 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | A. No, that's from the GISA numbers. |
| 17 | Q. At the end of December 2017, but I don't | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | know any - | 18 | Q. That's a GISA number? |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 20 | A. Okay, but it could vary from year to year? | 20 | A. Sorry, should be a GISA number, I believe. |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 22 | Q. Oh, I'm sure it would. | 22 | Q. Can you tell me where in GISA we'll find |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | that, please? |
| 24 | A. And secondly, you don't know what that | 24 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 25 | number is for the auto insurance companies | 25 | A. Okay, going back-sorry, this is not GISA, |


|  | Page 113 | Page 115 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | it's from the individual insurance | 1 | Q. | No. |  |
| 2 | companies, from the MSA research base. | 2 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 3 | A. | What's |  |
| 4 | Q. So, this is MSA information you're saying? | 4 |  | P, Q.C. |  |
| 5 | DR. LAZAR: | 5 | Q. | I don't |  |
| 6 | A. Yes. | 6 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 7 | A. | Okay. |  |
| 8 | Q. Okay. So, they've done some kind of a | 8 |  | P, Q.C. |  |
| 9 | calculation to break down Newfoundland - | 9 | Q. | Okay, |  |
| 10 | DR. LAZAR: | 10 |  | someth |  |
| 11 | A. No, they've just reported, here's the net | 11 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 12 | income from investment, here's the equity | 12 | A. | Um-hm | know, |
| 13 | and we've allocated it to these companies. | 13 |  | other co |  |
| 14 | They didn't so these calculations. We used | 14 |  | investin |  |
| 15 | their numbers, simply a matter of taking a | 15 |  | P, Q.C. |  |
| 16 | ratio between two numbers to produce these | 16 | Q. | Okay. |  |
| 17 | numbers. | 17 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | A. | If I add |  |
| 19 | Q. I'm going to ask if we can bring up the | 19 |  | still not |  |
| 20 | source of the information that I was | 20 |  | operati | dor, the |
| 21 | referring to. Do you see that, Mr. Lazar, | 21 |  | splits a |  |
| 22 | it's on the screen now? | 22 |  | remem |  |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 |  | what w |  |
| 24 | A. Yes. | 24 |  | P, Q.C. |  |
| 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 25 | Q. | Okay. | back now |
|  | Page 114 |  |  |  | Page 116 |
| 1 | Q. So this is, I take it, Canada wide, P\&C? | 1 |  | if I |  |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 |  | Get my | your |
| 3 | A. Um-hm. | 3 |  | report, |  |
| 4 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 4 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 5 | Q. I'm assuming - can we just go to the top | 5 | A. | Yeah. |  |
| 6 | again, please? Yes, okay, so that's the | 6 |  | M, Q.C. |  |
| 7 | discussion. It's an IBC document. If you | 7 | Q. | And you | bout the |
| 8 | can just go down to the bottom, you'll see | 8 |  | exclus | mpanies? |
| 9 | there, it's investments and I guess, it's | 9 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 10 | millions of dollars I guess it is, as of | 10 | A. | Yes. |  |
| 11 | December 31, 2017 and at the bottom of that, | 11 |  | MP, Q.C. |  |
| 12 | it's hard to make it out, but it looks like | 12 | Q. | And th | 24. |
| 13 | "as of 2016 Q4 Investments reported through | 13 |  | So, you |  |
| 14 | OSFI regulatory returns exclude pool funds | 14 |  | that ch |  |
| 15 | accounted using equity method, source IBC, | 15 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 16 | MSA, SCOR AMF and you'll see shares are | 16 | A. | I belie |  |
| 17 | shown both as a dollar amount and as a | 17 |  | IP, Q.C. |  |
| 18 | percentage. | 18 | Q. | I just d |  |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 20 | A. What's the other category? | 20 | A. | It soun |  |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 |  | MP, Q.C. |  |
| 22 | Q. Well, it looks like mortgages. | 22 | Q. | And I' |  |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 |  | over. I |  |
| 24 | A. No, no, no, the - | 24 |  | discus |  |
| 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 25 |  | along. |  |



| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 3 | DR. LAZAR: |  |
| 4 | A. In the case of Zurich, if you were throwing |  |
| 5 | that in, that would have affected it because |  |
| 6 | it was in and out, and you want consistency, |  |
| 7 | you wanted companies that were in this |  |
| 8 | industry throughout this period. |  |
| 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 10 | Q. Okay, okay. So, on that note, I want to |  |
| 11 | bring up the material from the |  |
| 12 | superintendent who was the regular, one of |  |
| 13 | the regulators in Newfoundland, the |  |
| 14 | Superintendent of Insurance. He publishes a |  |
| 15 | report showing insurance premiums and claims |  |
| 16 | and so on. And if we turn to that, that's | 16 |
| 17 | been-I think it's on the system now. We've |  |
| 18 | provided the table 1 chart from the |  |
| 19 | Superintendent's Report from 2011 through | 19 |
| 20 | 2016. Okay? So, if we can bring up 2011, | 20 |
| 21 | please. And with '11 I'll turn first to ACE | 2 |
| 22 | INA Insurance. That's the first one on the | 22 |
| 23 | second page, the first company. This is a | 23 |
| 24 | published document by the Public Utilities- | 2 |
| 25 | by, I'm, sorry, by the Superintendent of | 2 |
|  | Page 122 |  |
| 1 | Insurance. This one is published for 2011, |  |
| 2 | and if you turn to the last page, just to |  |
| 3 | have the-we have that last page just to show |  |
| 4 | you how it's-how they're focusing on it, |  |
| 5 | there's some totals on that last page which |  |
| 6 | is page 14 of this document at the bottom of |  |
| 7 | the page. So, you'll see that in-under the |  |
| 8 | columns for automobile insurance they have a |  |
| 9 | number of categories, but total earned |  |
| 10 | premiums is the middle line. And you'll see |  |
| 11 | the total earned premiums in, I guess, in |  |
| 12 | thousands of dollars. So, the total earned |  |
| 13 | premium for liability, 245 million, plus; |  |
| 14 | for personal accident, 29 million; for |  |
| 15 | other, 106 million. Okay? So, that's what |  |
| 16 | they-that how they do it, and then you go |  |
| 17 | back to the front, to the second page of the |  |
| 18 | exhibit, you'll see that they, for each |  |
| 19 | company, they provide a similar breakdown, |  |
| 20 | and in the second row in each case it's the | 2 |
| 21 | total earned premium, and in the third row | 2 |
| 22 | it's total direct claims. That's what the | 2 |
| 23 | Superintendent reports. So, here we have | 2 |
| 24 | ACE INA Insurance. They weren't included in | 2 |
| 25 | your study, were they? |  |

## DR. LAZAR:

A. No, we didn't get data on that company.

STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Okay. I can tell you that if we looked at all the charts, my understanding that they provided insurance coverage or wrote premium 2011 through 2015, but not in ' 16 , and the total premium was about 1.7 million dollars, would that be a number that should have been included in some fashion in your analysis?
(12:00 p.m.)
DR. LAZAR:
A. You said they weren't in there in 2016 ?

STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. They were not there in ' 16 .

DR. LAZAR:
A. Well, we would have excluded them because we would not have consistency.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Okay.

DR. LAZAR:
A. Remember the purpose of the companies are included here were for estimating for incorporating them into the capital asset pricing model to estimate a measure of the

Page 124
risk profile.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Let me jump down, Mr. Lazar, to the next page, the top of the next page, Atlantic Insurance. Do you see that entry?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Um-hm.

STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. I can tell you that in this year, they have of course as you can see, 2.9 million and 98 thousand and then 994 million in coverages, but I've taken the trouble of going through the-all of these reports from '11 through '16. And Atlantic Insurance premium in 2011 was 3.9 million; 3.6 plus in 2012; 3.4 million plus in 2013; just shy of 3.5 million in 2014; just over 3 million in 2015; and 2.4 million in 2016. An approximate total of 20 million dollars in earned premium in the six-year period. Why would they be excluded?
DR. LAZAR:
A. Again, if they're not on our list, the only three we excluded were those three that we mentioned. If we didn't get data for them,

|  | Page 125 |  | Page 127 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | then we did not incorporate them into our | 1 | A. No, no, no, please. Please. |
| 2 | analysis. | 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
|  | STAMP, Q.C.: | 3 | Q. Just go ahead. |
| 4 | Q. Did you ask, or did you look, at the | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | Superintendent's Reports to see what other | 5 | A. You know, I think it's important to |
| 6 | data would be available? | 6 | understand this. So, here are the premiums |
| 7 | DR. LAZAR: | 7 | that were set. The premiums that were |
| 8 | A. No, we went strictly to MSA. | 8 | charged could have been lower for various |
| 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 9 | reasons, competitive reasons or whatever. |
| 10 | Q. So, if MSA didn't have Atlantic and you're- | 10 | The actual performance of the insurance |
| 11 | and you say they don't - | 11 | companies would have been-could have been |
| 12 | DR. LAZAR: | 12 | different from what was anticipated and |
| 13 | A. Right. | 13 | could have been different from that ten |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 14 | percent because the claims experience was |
| 15 | Q. - they missed 20 million dollars worth of | 15 | different, their operating expenses |
| 16 | premium from an insurer who wrote every year | 16 | experience were different. Okay? But here |
| 17 | from '11 through '16? | 17 | are the premiums that were set. Our |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 | argument based solely on what would have |
| 19 | A. Okay. Now, let me explain the relevance of | 19 | been appropriate return on equity suggests |
| 20 | this, if any. If we had this complete set, | 20 | even if you use the ROI assumptions, even if |
| 21 | and we had an expanded data set, would that | 21 | you use the expense assumptions, because the |
| 22 | have produced a different estimate for beta | 22 | ROE should have been lower, the permitted |
| 23 | and the risk profile? Maybe. Would the | 23 | premiums would have been lower. So, you're |
| 24 | beta have been higher or lower? Don't know. | 24 | going to get that gap year in, year out, |
| 25 | Could have been lower which would have meant | 25 | which means you have overpayment of |
|  | Page 126 |  | Page 128 |
| 1 | the return equity according to the capital | 1 | premiums. Adjusting for the ROE for the |
| 2 | asset pricing model should have been lower. | 2 | return on investment and expenses expands |
| 3 | Could the beta have been higher? Possibly, | 3 | that. Now, what happens when insurance |
| 4 | which would have biased it upwards. What's | 4 | companies lose money? It should matter to |
| 5 | the degree of sort of adjustment in the beta | 5 | the regulator. There are assumptions made |
| 6 | as a result of having a more complete set? | 6 | the beginning. You set the premiums. The |
| 7 | We don't know. I'm willing to bet that it's | 7 | experience is going to vary. Some years the |
| 8 | not going to change that much. You know, | 8 | industry will actually do better than at |
| 9 | our estimate of return on equity might be a | 9 | regulated return in equity if they got |
| 10 | little higher. Now, with regards to the | 10 | lucky. Some years they're going to do |
| 11 | loss estimates and that's probably what | 11 | worse. They got unlucky for the industry as |
| 12 | you're getting to, let me make this clear, | 12 | a whole. Within the industry in a given |
| 13 | was there overpayment in every year of | 13 | year, some companies do better, some do |
| 14 | premiums? The answer to that is | 14 | worse. So, if you're doing the analysis |
| 15 | unequivocally yes, regardless of the actual | 15 | correctly, the actual after-the-fact return |
| 16 | performance of the insurance companies. | 16 | on equities from estimating the overpayments |
| 17 | Now, how can I say this with certainty? | 17 | almost becomes irrelevant. What matters is |
| 18 | Because the assumptions that were used in | 18 | what were the assumptions used in setting |
| 19 | setting the premiums used a return in equity | 19 | the premiums. What happens during the year |
| 20 | that too high, used a return in investment | 20 | and the final performance becomes |
| 21 | that was too low, and did not look at best | 21 | irrelevant. So if we included a larger |
| 22 | practices with regards to expenses. So - | 22 | sample of companies, it affects the data, it |
| 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 23 | would affect our estimate of the return on |
| 24 | Q. So, even in the - | 24 | equity. Would it push that return on equity |
| 25 | DR. LAZAR: | 25 | up to 10 percent; no way, wouldn't even come |


|  | Page 129 |  | Page 131 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | close. With regards to overpayments, even | 1 | on equity, therefore, should be equal to the |
| 2 | in the years when the insurance companies | 2 | risk free rate, 2.5 percent. So if you want |
| 3 | lost money, the answer to that is there were | 3 | to spend more time going through this, |
| 4 | overpayments, period, because you used | 4 | that's fine. I no longer see the relevance |
| 5 | different assumptions for setting the | 5 | of it, but you've got the floor, you can |
| 6 | premiums than what should have been used, | 6 | pursue it. |
| 7 | plain and simple. So you can look at this | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 8 | data, you can say we did include these, you | 8 | Q. Sovereign Insurance is not on your list, as |
| 9 | should have included these, what about those | 9 | I see it. It wrote insurance every year |
| 10 | negative years, the reality is using logic, | 10 | just under 20 million dollars, 2.6, 3.6, |
| 11 | using common sense, using different sets of | 11 | 2.8, 3.2 or 3.3, 3.2, 3.9. They're not |
| 12 | assumptions that were more appropriate, | 12 | included. |
| 13 | they're overpayments. | 13 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 14 | A. Okay, but again we can go through it company |
| 15 | Q. We're going to come back to all that, Mr. | 15 | by company. I'm not denying any of this. |
| 16 | Lazar. All of that we'll come back to, but | 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 17 | the first piece - | 17 | Q. Okay. |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 19 | A. Yeah, but it's - | 19 | A. All I'm asking is, what's the relevance of |
| 20 | KENNEDY, Q.C.: | 20 | it? |
| 21 | Q. Is he finished? The witness has to be | 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 22 | allowed to finish his answer. | 22 | Q. Right. |
| 23 | DR. LAZAR: | 23 | DR. LAZAR: |
| $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | A. But again we can go through these tables, you can go company to company, why didn't | 24 25 | A. And I've answered what the relevance of it is. |
|  | Page 130 |  | Page 132 |
| 1 | you include it, we didn't have it. You have | 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 2 | to understand what difference would this | 2 | Q. Well, you excluded Zurich, according to your |
| 3 | have made, and I'm saying the only place it | 3 | note, because it didn't write - |
| 4 | comes in, it comes in two places; one, how | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | does it impact the return on equity, and in | 5 | A. Because we had data available on Zurich. |
| 6 | my view, without looking at the companies we | 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | missed, without including them, their | 7 | Q. You excluded it? |
| 8 | impacts, I'm willing to bet, would have been | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | marginal. The worst case scenario, it would | 9 | A. Because we had data available. These |
| 10 | have increased what would have been | 10 | companies you're pointing out, they're not |
| 11 | appropriate after tax return on equity, 25 , | 11 | on a list, we didn't have the data available |
| 12 | 50, 75 basis points. Averaged over that | 12 | on them. |
| 13 | period, you go from 6 to maybe 6.75 percent | 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | maybe. Just as likely it could have reduced | 14 | Q. The data is right here in the |
| 15 | it. So that's the worst case scenario for | 15 | Superintendent's Report published every year |
| 16 | estimating overpayments, but in terms of | 16 | for Newfoundland. |
| 17 | overpayments, premiums too high, I say | 17 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 18 | unequivocally that was the case in every | 18 | Q. Madam Chair, this has been asked now a |
| 19 | year regardless of what data you show me, | 19 | number of times. Mr. Lazar has given his |
| 20 | regardless of what happens if you include | 20 | answer. He's indicating, "I've given you my |
| 21 | those negative years. If you're going to | 21 | answer, it's the same answer, you can refer |
| 22 | tell me that we've got to guarantee the | 22 | to each company and go through line by line, |
| 23 | insurance companies generate this return on | 23 | that's my answer". He shouldn't keep - it's |
| 24 | equity each and every year, then the risk is | 24 | now quarter after 12. How much time are we |
| 25 | being shifted onto consumers and the return | 25 | going to spend going over and over the same |


|  | Page 133 |  | Page 135 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | thing. | 1 | matters, if you want us to include to |
| 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 2 | broaden this, great, give us the detailed |
| 3 | Q. Until, I guess, I get my questions answered. | 3 | information, we'll be able - we'll do it on |
| 4 | MR. FELTHAM: | 4 | our time, our expense, to see how it affects |
| 5 | Q. The problem is Mr. Stamp doesn't like the | 5 | that measure of data, and I suspect it's |
| 6 | answer that he's getting. | 6 | going to have a trivial effect on that |
| 7 | A. But, you know - | 7 | estimate of data, and hence on the estimate |
| 8 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: | 8 | of the return on equity, okay. |
| 9 | Q. Excuse me, Dr. Lazar, as hearing counsel, I | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | just make the observation, Madam Chair, that | 10 | Q. But, Mr. Lazar - |
| 11 | Mr. Stamp is entitled to ask what dataset is | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | relied upon in a presenter's report. Do I | 12 | A. Now if you want us to do the complete |
| 13 | simply turn it back and say, you know, maybe | 13 | thorough analysis, and go to the regulatory |
| 14 | the fastest way forward is to let Mr. Stamp | 14 | data, if you also have the ex anti-claims |
| 15 | ask his questions and then we can take that | 15 | numbers, we can run this through. I've done |
| 16 | information which way it goes. Constantly | 16 | some simple calculations that suggest the |
| 17 | interrupting, as I've said earlier, for the | 17 | overpayment on the premiums probably run 8 |
| 18 | sake of good order in the transcript, it's | 18 | to 10 percent per year, year in, year out, |
| 19 | not that helpful. So I think in the context | 19 | regardless of the performance, and I base |
| 20 | that we're in, Mr. Stamp is simply asking | 20 | this on looking at what the multiple of the |
| 21 | about data. | 21 | claims should be based on different |
| 22 | DR. LAZAR: | 22 | assumptions with regards to expense ratio, |
| 23 | A. If I can say something, I have no problem - | 23 | the ROE, and the return on investment. |
| 24 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: | 24 | Simple calculations. I can just run through |
| 25 | Q. Excuse me, Dr. Lazar, just - | 25 | a few of these and it gives me a number of 8 |
|  | Page 134 |  | Page 136 |
| 1 | CHAIR: | 1 | to 10 percent in premium overpayments year |
| 2 | Q. Excuse me, Mr. Lazar, you can respond to | 2 | in, year out. If you want, I'll expand the |
| 3 | questions from the - | 3 | dataset, I'm going to expand the premium |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | number and the overpayments. It's quite |
| 5 | A. Okay, sorry. Thank you. | 5 | simple. So you want to ask me other |
| 6 | CHAIR: | 6 | companies that are not on the list, and why |
| 7 | Q. Mr. Stamp, I understand the tenure of your | 7 | they're not in a list, the answer is the |
| 8 | questions. Are you going to ask the same | 8 | same, they weren't in the dataset that MSA |
| 9 | question with respect to each of the | 9 | sent us. Is it relevant for analysis; yes. |
| 10 | companies or is it a general - | 10 | Is it going to significant alter analysis; |
| 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 11 | I'm willing to say probably not. Does it |
| 12 | Q. I won't do that. We'll capture this, Madam | 12 | affect our conclusions with regards to |
| 13 | Chair, I guess, in other materials later on, | 13 | overpayments on the premiums? Absolutely |
| 14 | but Zurich was specifically excluded we were | 14 | not. |
| 15 | told because they only wrote three years. | 15 | AMP, Q.C.: |
| 16 | Is that right, Mr. Lazar? | 16 | Q. Are you done? Zurich, you report only wrote |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 | a premium or collected premium in ' 11, ' 15 , |
| 18 | A. I can repeat this only one way. We were | 18 | and '16, and yet the Superintendent's Report |
| 19 | given a certain dataset. The companies | 19 | shows that they were also here for ' $12,{ }^{\prime} 13$, |
| 20 | you're pointing out were not on that | 20 | and '14. About the same numbers through the |
| 21 | dataset. With the OSFI data, I suspect all | 21 | whole piece in those years as well. |
| 22 | the detailed other information may or may | 22 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 23 | not be available. Why MSA did not include | 23 | A. That's not what the data that we were given |
| 24 | these, go contact MSA. From our | 24 | said. |
| 25 | perspective, and as I said, all that | 25 | (12:15 p.m.) |


| STAMP, Q.C.: |  |  | Page 139 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 2 | Q. Right. So what I'm back to is you had said | 2 | Q. Are you referring to both here or just one? |
| 3 | earlier that you didn't have available the | 3 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 4 | permitted premiums in Newfoundland, which | 4 | A. I'm just referring to one. |
| 5 | are all published through this Public | 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 6 | Utilities Board, you didn't have the data on | 6 | Q. Which one are you referring to? |
| 7 | who wrote insurance, and you just had to go | 7 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 8 | to the Superintendent's information and | 8 | A. The return on their investment portfolio. |
| 9 | you'd have every insurance company for every | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | year in the period you're interested in, | 10 | Q. So you're not referring to equity here? |
| 11 | 2011 through 2016. Every single company is | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | here, and you relied on 17 insurers, I | 12 | A. No. |
| 13 | guess, that you were provided with data from | 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | MSA or MSI, whatever they're called, and you | 14 | Q. Returns on equity is not being referred to? |
| 15 | excluded a bunch of those. Is that right? | 15 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 16 | DR. LAZAR: | 16 | A. No. |
| 17 | A. Yes. | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | Q. You say that it is, but it's not, I take it? |
| 19 | Q. Okay, because there's, I don't know, 30 or | 19 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 20 | 40 insurers here. Your report at page 12, | 20 | A. Not in that point. |
| 21 | Mr. Lazar, this is when you're speaking | 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 22 | about the ROI, you identify the ROI produced | 22 | Q. Okay, and at page 30, if you can just turn |
| 23 | by Oliver Wyman. That's out of their | 23 | to that page, there's a series of bullets |
| 24 | report, is it not, that table? | 24 | there, and again I'm trying to understand |
| 25 | DR. LAZAR: | 25 | what terminology you use, or what you |
|  | Page 138 |  | Page 140 |
| 1 | A. Yes. | 1 | understand to be the discussion, in the |
| 2 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 2 | fifth bullet it says, "Expected investment |
| 3 | Q. At Table 6? | 3 | income return on equity". Is that the same |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | thing? |
| 5 | A. Yes. | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | A. No, it's the investment, return investment, |
| 7 | Q. And at Table 7, you produce a table th | 7 | the denominator we equated with equity, and |
| 8 | some of it is GISA data, and some of your | 8 | again if you go to the preceding table, |
| 9 | own calculations, I believe. Is that | 9 | that's how the numbers are calculated, and |
| 10 | correct? | 10 | here investment return on equity, it's not |
| 11 | DR. LAZAR: | 11 | the return on equity, the net profit of the |
| 12 | A. These should all be derived from the GISA | 12 | company divided by their equity, but rather |
| 13 | data, yes. Some of these ratios. | 13 | their net investment income divided by their |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 14 | investment portfolio, which we equated with |
| 15 | Q. Well, let me just make sure I'm clear, first | 15 | equity. This is not the return on equity, |
| 16 | of all, just a couple of point. If you can | 16 | it's the return on their investment. |
| 17 | pop ahead to page 14, and Item 4 . I want to | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | make sure we speak the same language. You | 18 | Q. So, is bullet 15 (sic) properly explained or |
| 19 | say in Item 4, "The returns on equity, or | 19 | properly described? |
| 20 | ROI, keeping in mind the preceding | 20 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 21 | observations, were in excess of 10 percent". | 21 | A. Bullet? Well, we thought it was properly |
| 22 | Are you saying both, or is ROE and ROI the | 22 | described, but obviously it was |
| 23 | same thing? | 23 | misinterpreted. We said, "Return on |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | equity". We just stated explicitly the |
| 25 | A. No, they're different. | 25 | "return on equity". |


|  | Page 141 |  | Page 143 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 | divide that by the equity. That's the |
| 2 | Q. Okay, all right, just come back to Table 7 | 2 | return on equity. So the return, what we |
| 3 | at page 13, please. | 3 | call return on investment - a line that |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | comes farther up in that table, that's just |
| 5 | A. Which table? | 5 | one component of their overall |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | profitability. |
| 7 | Q. Seven. | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 8 | DR. LAZAR: | 8 | Q. But I'm looking at this line, investment |
| 9 | A. Seven. | 9 | income over equity. Now, am I looking at a |
| 10 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 10 | return on investment? |
| 11 | Q. And three parts of the way down that table, | 11 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 12 | there's a net investment income? | 12 | A. Return on investment. |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 14 | A. Yeah. | 14 | Q. I take it -- and this pops up at your Table |
| 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 15 | 9 as well -- the same numbers show up in |
| 16 | Q. And below that an allocated equity, and then | 16 | Table 9 ? |
| 17 | you divide the two? | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 | A. Yes. | 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 | Q. So, if I take \$1,000 and invest it and earn |
| 21 | Q. And that gives you 15.08 in ' $12,10.9$ in | 21 | \$100, I do a calculation that says what my |
| 22 | '13, and so on, up to 6.4 in '16. Is that | 22 | return on my investment was. |
| 23 | right? | 23 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 24 | DR. LAZAR: | 24 | A. Ten percent. |
| 25 | A. Yes. | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
|  | Page 142 |  | Page 144 |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 | Q. If I happen to own a house, I don't throw |
| 2 | Q. And you identify that as return on equity, | 2 | that into the discussion to see what my |
| 3 | do you not? | 3 | return on my investment was. I just take |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | the \$1,000 I invested and the income I made |
| 5 | A. No, that's return on investment. | 5 | on that \$1,000, don't I? |
| 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 6 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 7 | Q. It's return on investment? | 7 | A. See that's - if you do that, that's because |
| 8 | DR. LAZAR: | 8 | you didn't take a finance course. Because |
| 9 | A. Okay, there are two parts here, and they | 9 | finance makes it quite clear, you have to |
| 10 | both involve equity, so assuming the equity | 10 | look at all your assets, not just pure |
| 11 | that companies commit a certain amount of | 11 | financial assets. |
| 12 | cash, that's equivalent to the reserves that | 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 13 | are available to invest. So we assume that | 13 | Q. Um-hm. |
| 14 | the two are the same. So that pool is | 14 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 15 | available and invested in a group of | 15 | A. For most people, the house is the biggest |
| 16 | financial assets. What we're measuring here | 16 | asset. |
| 17 | is what's the return on that investment | 17 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 18 | pool, and that will then filter into | 18 | Q. Right. |
| 19 | determining the overall profitability of the | 19 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 20 | companies. Then you look at - the last line | 20 | A. So you throw that into the base and you look |
| 21 | there, and the insurance companies, they | 21 | at what is - so, your capital appreciation. |
| 22 | make underwriting profits or losses, they | 22 | I mean there's capital losses on that less |
| 23 | make money on all their investments. Add | 23 | whatever sort of maintenance expenditures |
| 24 | the two together, that gives you your | 24 | you incur. |
| 25 | overall profitability. Profit or loss, you | 25 | STAMP, Q.C.: |




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    1 CHAIR:
Q. It'll be a transcript reference, Mr. Lazar.
DR. LAZAR:
A. Oh, okay.
CHAIR:
Q. It should show up there, yeah.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. We're discussing with Ms. Elliott this
    concept of ROI and at the very top of page
        86, my question is "and so, it's a division
        of course to get that number parity, but
        from 2012-2016, the authors of this report
        come up with investment income to equity.
        Is that ROI? Is that what they're thinking 14
        about?"
            Ms. Elliott's response is "No, this is
        not. ROI is return on your investments
        which is a ratio of your investment income
        divided by your invested assets. What's
        presented here in this row is the investment
        income divided by the equity and the equity
        does not equal the invested assets."
            So, you have it as a proxy. Ms.
        Elliott says it is not a proxy.
DR. LAZAR:
1
2 Q. It'll be a transcript reference, Mr. Lazar.
3 DR. LAZAR:
4 A. Oh, okay.
5 CHAIR:
Q. It should show up there, yeah.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. We're discussig wit MS. Elfothis
        13
Ms. Elliott's response is "No, this is not. ROI is return on your investments which is a ratio of your investment income divided by your invested assets. What's presented here in this row is the investment income divided by the equity and the equity does not equal the invested assets."
So, you have it as a proxy. Ms. Elliott says it is not a proxy.
DR. LAZAR:
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                    Page 154
    A. Okay. And did she provide any estimate or
        number of the invested assets?
    STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. If we just turn to page 90 , and at page 90 ,
Ms. Elliott is speaking about this topic
again, because I explained how your numbers
were fundamentally different from hers and
she said "Right. No, because a return on
investment rate are your investment income
including the realized capital gains and
losses. That's included in the number that
we present and it's taken as a ratio of the
average at the beginning of the year and the
end of the year of your investment assets
that you have. So, all your investments,
your bonds and your stocks and everything
else, these are the actual return on
investment rates that are reported in what's
referred to as a P\&C-1, a financial
statement that is audited, and each company
is required to file this annually with the
regulatory OSFI. So, our numbers are
different. What Lazar has presented is a
ratio of the investment income as he has
extracted it from GISA exhibit divided by

Page 154

|  |  | Page 154 |
| ---: | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | A. | Okay. And did she provide any estimate or |
| 2 | number of the invested assets? |  |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 4 | Q. | If we just turn to page 90, and at page 90, |
| 5 |  | Ms. Elliott is speaking about this topic |
| 6 |  | again, because I explained how your numbers |
| 7 |  | were fundamentally different from hers and |
| 8 |  | she said "Right. No, because a return on |
| 9 |  | investment rate are your investment income |
| 10 |  | including the realized capital gains and |
| 11 |  | losses. That's included in the number that |
| 12 |  | we present and it's taken as a ratio of the |
| 13 |  | average at the beginning of the year and the |
| 14 |  | end of the year of your investment assets |
| 15 | that you have. So, all your investments, |  |
| 16 |  | your bonds and your stocks and everything |
| 17 | else, these are the actual return on |  |
| 18 | investment rates that are reported in what's |  |
| 19 | referred to as a P\&C-1, a financial |  |
| 20 | statement that is audited, and each company |  |
| 21 | is required to file this annually with the |  |
| 22 |  | regulatory OSFI. So, our numbers are |
| 23 |  | different. What Lazar has presented is a |
| 24 | ratio of the investment income as he has |  |
| 25 | extracted it from GISA exhibit divided by |  |

.
equity and equity in invested assets are not the same." Investment assets are not the same thing I think she's saying.

So, I asked does it make any sense the way you did it, and at the top of page 91 , she says "no, because it's not an ROI". And of course, down at the bottom of page 91, she says and it would have been a flag. You see at the bottom, she says "and so, if you see this measurement as presented by Lazar, you know, double digit 15 percent, we know that would be a red flag because we know that government bonds that companies invest in are not 15 percent. So, it's different. Something else, it's not ROI."

Now, Mr. Lazar, you were asked questions by the Public Utilities Board and we've gone through some of them and I think we'll have a look at -
KENNEDY, Q.C.:
Q. Excuse me, Madam Chair. Is there a question there? He just read from a transcript and said Ms. Elliott said this and now he's moving to another area. I mean, if you're going to do that, there has to be a

Page 156 question.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. I pointed out to Mr. Lazar that Ms. Elliott has taken a fundamentally different position; that she does not agree that investment and equity are the same thing. Mr. Lazar has said one is a proxy for the other and she disagrees. That's my point again.

## CHAIR:

Q. To be fair, Mr. Lazar should be able to respond to it.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. Sure. He can respond to that if he wishes. DR. LAZAR:
A. I'll only have two comments. If I'm not mistaken, in her work the only return on investment she included were dividends and interest payments. She didn't include any capital gains on any of the financial assets. And second, I don't recall in her report any data on what the magnitude were of these assets, and what's in the response what the magnitude of these assets. So, if she says they're in the OSFI filings,

|  | Page 157 |  | Page 159 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | wonderful. What's the number and how does | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | it differ from the equity number that we're | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | approximating? | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | I mean, even if you double the | 4 | Q. And then that discussion is taken out more |
| 5 | denominator saying invested assets are twice | 5 | fully I think in page 16 of your report? |
| 6 | the equity, which I seriously doubt is the | 6 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 7 | case, that still reduces returns to numbers | 7 | A. Page 16? |
| 8 | well above hers. | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 9 | Q. I believe. So you will see at Table 10 a |
| 10 | Q. Mr. Lazar, you were asked by the Public | 10 | comparison of general expense ratios, GISA |
| 11 | Utilities Board in questions that they put | 11 | and Oliver Wyman, and of course, the purpose |
| 12 | to you. | 12 | of you including this, is it not, to show |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 | that the Oliver Wyman expense ratios are |
| 14 | A. Yeah. | 14 | higher than GISA, was that the purpose of |
| 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 15 | it? |
| 16 | Q. This is Question 2B, and the question is: | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | "Do Dr. Lazar and Dr. Prisman find invested | 17 | A. Yes. |
| 18 | assets to be the same as equity?" | 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | Q. And the Oliver Wyman column comes right out |
| 20 | A. Yeah. | 20 | of the Oliver Wyman report and I just might |
| 21 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 21 | mention for the record it's at page 21, |
| 22 | Q. So explain why in the audited financial | 22 | Table 12 of the Oliver Wyman report, but |
| 23 | statements the invested assets, $\mathrm{P} \& \mathrm{Cl}$, page | 23 | your numbers, you say, are, you say they're |
| 24 | 20.10, are a different value than the | 24 | GISA numbers? |
| 25 | equity, $\mathrm{P} \& \mathrm{Cl}$, page 20.20 , for each insurer? | 25 | DR. LAZAR: |
|  | Page 158 |  | Page 160 |
| 1 | And then your response, I take it it's your | 1 | A. I think if you go back to Table 7 that's |
| 2 | response, is as follows, "As noted, we | 2 | where they are. |
| 3 | assumed invested assets and equity to be the | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | same. We made this assumption for two | 4 | Q. Yes. You're referring to the general |
| 5 | reasons. We did not have any data for | 5 | expense ratio? |
| 6 | reserves and in our work for FSCO on auto | 6 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 7 | insurance companies in Ontario, FSCO assumed | 7 | A. Yes. |
| 8 | that equity closely approximated invested | 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 9 | assets." So now you're telling us here not | 9 | Q. Right. Now, Oliver Wyman's information, |
| 10 | only that it's because FSCO does something, | 10 | we're told by Ms. Elliott here in her |
| 11 | you also tell us you don't have any data for | 11 | presentation, came out of the GISA Industry |
| 12 | reserves? | 12 | Expense Report. The industry expense |
| 13 | DR. LAZAR: | 13 | report, she said, provided the information |
| 14 | A. Not in the database that we had. | 14 | for expense ratios for each of the years, |
| 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 15 | actually only provided for ' $13, ~ ' 14, ~ ' 15$ and |
| 16 | Q. No, okay. | 16 | '16, I think she had to do a calculation for |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 | ' 12 , but certainly the industry expense |
| 18 | A. Is there any documentation from OSFI what | 18 | report at Page 20, this is the GISA Industry |
| 19 | the assets were and compared to the equity | 19 | Expense Report, has those rates, simply add |
| 20 | assumptions we made? I'd be curious to see | 20 | the two expense rates to get the 8.2, 7.2, |
| 21 | them. | 21 | $8.5-n o t 8.2$, sorry, 7.2, 8.5, 7.7 and 9.1. |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | KENNEDY, Q.C.: |
| 23 | Q. Mr. Lazar, in your report at page 30, you | 23 | Q. Is this a document we have? |
| 24 | have a discussion on operating expense | 24 | CHAIR: |
| 25 | ratios? | 25 | Q. It's Oliver Wyman's report. |




|  | Page 169 | Page 171 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | offer any explanation why the authors would | 1 |  | consumers have overpaid. I don't care how- |
| 2 | have left the expense report, the industry | 2 |  | what numbers you use, how you try to cast |
| 3 | expense report that has the data right in | 3 |  | this. Now, even if you use her numbers and |
| 4 | it, and gone to a different report to take a | 4 |  | again, she's not an economist, so I can't |
| 5 | different set of expense percentages?" Ms. | 5 |  | blame her for this, you've got to take into |
| 6 | Elliott says, "I have no idea why, I don't | 6 |  | account what are best practice, what are |
| 7 | know." I asked, "Does it make any sense?" | 7 |  | expense ratios that should be the target for |
| 8 | She says, "No, I don't agree with their | 8 |  | the Board. |
| 9 | number, they are missing a component of the | 9 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 10 | general expenses." And I say, "You're not | 10 | Q. | Madam Chair, if I can just interrupt here. |
| 11 | comparing apples and apples?" And she says, | 11 |  | It's not focussing on the question that I |
| 12 | "Right." So her point is, and you can | 12 |  | asked, it's focussing on- |
| 13 | answer this, Mr. Lazar, you've missed | 13 |  | AZAR: |
| 14 | expenses when you used the percentages that | 14 | A. | Yes, but there's got to be context. |
| 15 | you used which she says comes from the | 15 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 16 | Industry Profit and Loss Report and don't | 16 | Q. | It's giving us a seminar that he gave |
| 17 | come from the Industry Expense Report. | 17 |  | earlier in his direct evidence or his direct |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 |  | presentation. |
| 19 | A. Okay, I'll answer this as quickly as I can. | 19 |  | AZAR: |
| 20 | I'm sure Ms. Elliott is a great actuary, I'm | 20 | A. | But again, it's the context, you're asking |
| 21 | not going to question her, I'm sure she's | 21 |  | me these questions, what the difference is, |
| 22 | extremely good. She's not an economist and | 22 |  | so the question is what difference does it |
| 23 | she misses the point entirely. So let's | 23 |  | make for the fundamental question, and my |
| 24 | take her expense numbers, use those, and I | 24 |  | answer is it doesn't, there are |
| 25 | believe it's one to put in context, what's | 25 |  | overpayments, regardless of what numbers you |
|  | Page 170 |  |  | Page 172 |
| 1 | the relevance of all of this if we use a | 1 |  | throw in because of the differences in |
| 2 | higher number? There is no relevance for | 2 |  | return on equity that were used and that |
| 3 | the question of did consumers of auto | 3 |  | should have been used, that's the bottom |
| 4 | insurance in this province pay too much? | 4 |  | line. Then, is her number the right one to |
| 5 | It's not relevant and here's the reason why. | 5 |  | have been used in the exercise, that's |
| 6 | If you accept her expense numbers, let's | 6 |  | another question. And my answer to that is, |
| 7 | take them, so they're going to enter into | 7 |  | no, it's not, regardless of general expense |
| 8 | the rate setting process. What are the two | 8 |  | number it's the wrong number to use because, |
| 9 | key variables that we still disagree upon? | 9 |  | again, not being an economist, you don't |
| 10 | The return on equity and the return on | 10 |  | realize that part of the regulatory process |
| 11 | investment. The return on equity, Ms. | 11 |  | is to incentivize the companies that are |
| 12 | Elliott, that was not her area of expertise, | 12 |  | being regulated to achieve the best |
| 13 | that's not what she was asked to do. So all | 13 |  | practices. |
| 14 | I'm saying is even if we take her expense | 14 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | numbers for the time being, plug them in and | 15 | Q. | Madam Chair, you know, we're getting a |
| 16 | let's go through the exercise, let's | 16 |  | seminar here. I'm getting a lecture. |
| 17 | determine what the maximum premiums would | 17 |  |  |
| 18 | have been allowed with a 10 percent return | 18 | Q. | Did you get an answer to your question, Mr. |
| 19 | in equity, whatever number you want for the | 19 |  | Stamp? |
| 20 | return on investment, here the premiums | 20 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 21 | would have been allowed, redo that with a | 21 |  | Well my point was, simply this - |
| 22 | lower return on equity number, use her | 22 |  |  |
| 23 | return investment if you want, use her | 23 |  | Did you ask a question first of all? |
| 24 | expense numbers, that maximum allowable | 24 |  | PP, Q.C.: |
| 25 | premium is going to be lower, which means | 25 | Q. | I asked a question, but first of all I'm |


|  | $\text { Page } 173$ |  | Page 175 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | going to go back because Mr. Lazar keeps | 1 | regardless of what expense ratio you plug |
| 2 | going around and around in these long-winded | 2 | in, regardless what return on investment you |
| 3 | answers. The fact is he has said the | 3 | plug in because you used the wrong return on |
| 4 | expense ratio doesn't matter. Now he's | 4 | equity. And then the other question |
| 5 | explained it's one of the three, I think, | 5 | becomes, even if you take her number - |
| 6 | critical points to why he says the premium | 6 | AMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | is overpaid. | 7 | Q. So, go ahead, go ahead. |
| 8 | CHAIR: | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | Q. I think | 9 | A. Okay, she used it to try and estimate |
| 10 | I just wanted to know if you got an answer | 10 | premium over underpayment for 2017, but she |
| 11 | to the question that I thought you asked. | 11 | never asked the question what are the best |
| 12 | MP, Q.C.: | 12 | practices, so our criticism of her work was |
| 13 | Q. I'll ask it again, Madam Chair. | 13 | when she tried to take what she had done and |
| 14 | CHAIR: | 14 | then try to extend it to deal with what |
| 15 | Q. Okay, that's fair enoug | 15 | should be the fundamental question here, |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | were premiums too high or too low? That's |
| 17 | Q. Why would you exclude pertinent expenses | 17 | where our criticism came in and that's my |
| 18 | from the expense ratio? | 18 | criticism of her work, period. |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | LAHERTY, Q.C.: |
| 20 | A. Because the dataset I had and we used didn't | 20 | Q. Madam Chair, earlier this morning we had |
| 21 | distinguish th | 21 | discussed perhaps we would check at around |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | 12:45 and I see we are past that, to see how |
| 23 | Q. Okay, so you didn't look at all of | 23 | we were progressing with the examination and |
| 24 | charts that were available, you looked at | 24 | I have spoken with my learned friend, Mr. |
| 25 | one chart and picked it, is that correct? | 25 | Browne, and he indicated that he had a time |
|  | Page 174 |  | Page 176 |
| 1 | DR. LAZAR: | 1 | stimate he could share with us once we find |
| 2 | A. That seemed to be the relevant chart because | 2 | out from Mr. Stamp as to how he's |
| 3 | it's dealing with the profits of the | 3 | progressing with his questioning to |
| 4 | industry. | 4 | determine how we move forward. |
| 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 5 | CHAIR: |
| 6 | Q. Well Ms. Elliott, who is an actuary and | 6 | Q. Mr. Stamp, I don't want to put you in a |
| 7 | studies this all the time, says you looked | 7 | position of having to tell us how long you |
| 8 | at the wrong chart. | 8 | are going to be, but - |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 10 | A. But the issue is what does that have to do | 10 | Q. Madam Chair, we would typically stop at |
| 11 | with estimating overpayments? | 11 | $1: 30$, but if we kept going, we won't stop at |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | 1:30, so if you wish to take a break, |
| 13 | Q. Well it has this to do, does it not, | 13 | that's, you know, probably the best thing to |
| 14 | Lazar, doesn't it suggest that the | 14 | do if you feel that that is - |
| 15 | overpayment that you are contemplating or | 15 | CHAIR: |
| 16 | advancing has occurred, you're wrong on the | 16 | Q. Well, yes, let's take a fifteen-minute |
| 17 | expense ratio, that's one of the critical | 17 | break, let everybody get prepared for |
| 18 | points that you've made. | 18 | another, what appears to be at least an hour |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | or so, at least. |
| 20 | A. No, my answer is our analysis, whether you | 20 | KENNEDY, Q.C.: |
| 21 | accept it or not, is if you were to have | 21 | Q. Madam Chair, if we're going to do that, I'd |
| 22 | done the right analysis, to do it thoroughly | 22 | suggest we take a lunch break. I mean, we |
| 23 | you conclude unequivocally and I'll repeat | 23 | sat here yesterday until 2:30, you know, |
| 24 | it again and I hate to repeat things, but | 24 | this is just-we are sitting from 9:00 in the |
| 25 | premiums are too high, plain and simple, | 25 | morning to $2: 30$ in the afternoon. It's a |


|  | Page 177 |  | Page 179 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | very long time to be sitting here like this. | 1 | says, it all comes down to they've got to |
| 2 | I mean, we've got the witness, we've got | 2 | find best practices, is that where you are? |
| 3 | staff members, we've got all of us. If | 3 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 4 | we're not going to finish, I'd just as soon | 4 | A. That's one of the issues. |
| 5 | take the lunch break, come back and just | 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 6 | keep going, like we would do as if we were | 6 | Q. And because, as we have already talked |
| 7 | in a courtroom. | 7 | about, she has said to this panel in her |
| 8 | O'FLAHERTY, Q.C.: | 8 | evidence, in her presentation, that you have |
| 9 | Q. I don't think everybody has the | 9 | approached the ROI incorrectly. She also |
| 10 | availability. I'm seeing heads being shaken | 10 | said you've miscalculated the expense ratios |
| 11 | behind Mr. Kennedy, so I think, I don't | 11 | because you left out expenses, and these are |
| 12 | think that's going to be workable, Madam | 12 | the things that she says lead you where you |
| 13 | Chair. | 13 | have gone, to wrong conclusions. But you |
| 14 | CHAIR: | 14 | say it doesn't matter because, I think |
| 15 | Q. We're just going to push through to finish | 15 | you're saying best practices have to come |
| 16 | Mr. Lazar and whatever break is going to be | 16 | into play? |
| 17 | needed here, we'll take, so - | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | A. Okay, well I took advantage at the break to |
| 19 | Q. Did you want to take a break now, Madam | 19 | do some sort of rough calculations, to get |
| 20 | Chair? | 20 | an estimate of what the overpayments were, |
| 21 | CHAIR: | 21 | and - |
| 22 | Q. We'll take a fifteen-minute break and we'll | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | come back, is that okay for you, Mr. Browne? | 23 | Q. No, I don't want to go back to that |
| 24 | BROWNE, Q.C.: | 24 | overpayment, I want to come back to the |
| 25 | Q. Yes, that's fine, Chair. We can't go over | 25 | expense ratios. |
|  | Page 178 |  | Page 180 |
| 1 | the 2:00 mark, there's commitments and I'll | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | only be 10 minutes at most. My questions | 2 | A. No, no, but it's - |
| 3 | will be quite specific. | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | CHAIR: | 4 | Q. I want to stay focused on the questions. |
| 5 | Q. I understood yesterday, I think what we had | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | agreed to is that we would stay until we | 6 | A. Okay, but your question is saying, gee, if |
| 7 | finished Dr. Lazar, so that's what we'll try | 7 | we accepted everything Ms. Elliott said, |
| 8 | to do. Is your flight out today, sir? | 8 | then our estimates of the overpayments would |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 | disappear, her numbers that suggest there's |
| 10 | A. 5:30. | 10 | actually been underpayments would be valid. |
| 11 | CHAIR: | 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 12 | Q. 5:30, okay. Thank you, see you in about | 12 | Q. But you still say to that it's still not |
| 13 | fifteen minutes. | 13 | good enough because you've got to find a |
| 14 | (RECESS - 1:00 p.m.) | 14 | better way to do business? |
| 15 | (RESUME - 1:15 p.m.) | 15 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 16 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 16 | A. I'm saying that's one variable. I mean, I |
| 17 | Q. Batteries recharged, Mr. Lazar? | 17 | was going to say I did some calculations and |
| 18 | DR. LAZAR: | 18 | - |
| 19 | A. I think so. | 19 | CHAIR: |
| 20 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 20 | Q. Just a second now, did you get an answer to |
| 21 | Q. Good. Mr. Lazar, look, on this point | 21 | your- |
| 22 | generally that we've been talking about, | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | what you say is it doesn't matter about the | 23 | Q. No, I'm trying to be clear, I don't want to |
| 24 | expenses if they're what Ms. Elliott says, | 24 | go back over everything we've done, Mr. |
| 25 | it doesn't matter if the ROI is what she | 25 | Lazar. |



|  | Page 185 |  | Page 187 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Lazar, please. | 1 | above Table 5, you see that Oliver Wyman did |
| 2 | DR. LAZAR: | 2 | disaggregate the operating expenses in the |
| 3 | A. I'm going to have to, so I believe through | 3 | three categories. |
| 4 | her whole report here, claim methodology, | 4 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 5 | expenses, investment income, okay, so we | 5 | A. Yes. |
| 6 | used, the rate that was calculated there was | 6 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 7 | investment income, I guess on her page 8 she | 7 | Q. I asked Ms. Elliott about all that and |
| 8 | doesn't really explain this. | 8 | you'll find that discussion, or we can find |
| 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 9 | that discussion at page, I think it starts |
| 10 | Q. Are you saying she didn't include it? | 10 | at 104 , but primarily at 105 , I point out at |
| 11 | DR. LAZAR: | 11 | the top of page 105, this is all the |
| 12 | A. The numbers she had there did not, I'm sure | 12 | September 6th hearing date again that we're |
| 13 | - | 13 | referring to, and I'm referring to a table. |
| 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 14 | I say, "The authors say"-this is at line 4, |
| 15 | Q. Where are you, Mr. Lazar, I'm sorry, can you | 15 | 5, "The authors say that Oliver Wyman did |
| 16 | tell us where you are? | 16 | disaggregate the operating expenses into |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 | three categories and describes those |
| 18 | A. I'm looking at page 8 of her report. | 18 | categories and the breakdown is presented in |
| 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 19 | Table 5." And I'll skip down, she says, |
| 20 | Q. Of the March 29, Oliver Wyman report? | 20 | "That's correct." I say, "So it wasn't the |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 | case that Oliver Wyman broke the numbers |
| 22 | A. Table 6, okay, that's where she has the | 22 | down as we have in this table, the GISA |
| 23 | investment rates and she does not discuss | 23 | numbers are broken down that way?" She |
| 24 | what goes into the numerator, what are the | 24 | says, "That's correct, yes." And a little |
| 25 | returns. | 25 | further down on the page 106 at line 8 , she |
|  | Page 186 |  | Page 188 |
| 1 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 1 | says, "It's all clearly that I'm just taking |
| 2 | Q. So how did you conclude from that that she | 2 | the numbers from the chart and putting them |
| 3 | didn't take that into account? | 3 | in the table for our report." "So it wasn't |
| 4 | DR. LAZAR: | 4 | Oliver Wyman that disaggregated, it was GISA |
| 5 | A. I just looked at the low returns, I did a | 5 | had done this?" "Uh-hm, yeah." So the |
| 6 | comparison to, I think, what company do I | 6 | point that she's making is she's taken the |
| 7 | have here? Intact, where Intact reported | 7 | expenses and the point that she's making, of |
| 8 | their investment returns and their | 8 | course for your purpose, is that she took it |
| 9 | investment returns were clearly only | 9 | all from the Industry Expense Report and she |
| 10 | dividends and interest payments. | 10 | says I don't know why Mr. Lazar went to the |
| 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 11 | Industry Profit Report to take a subset of |
| 12 | Q. I don't know about Intact, but I know that | 12 | those expenses. So I'm going to leave this |
| 13 | Ms. Elliott testified here, page 90, that | 13 | topic, but if you have anything to say on |
| 14 | she took into account, I think it was here | 14 | that point before I go, by all means, this |
| 15 | that she said - | 15 | is the time to say it. |
| 16 | DR. LAZAR: | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | A. She didn't state that at all in her report | 17 | A. I'm trying to remember in her report she |
| 18 | and given the values here, the low values, | 18 | referred to GISA's-okay, what was it? Yeah, |
| 19 | that could only suggest that what was | 19 | Financial Information Industry Profit and |
| 20 | included were dividend and interest | 20 | Loss Report for Private Passenger |
| 21 | payments. | 21 | Automobiles, she referred to that and she |
| 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 22 | made some comparisons. |
| 23 | Q. Mr. Lazar, you talk about, let me just make | 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 24 | sure I've got the right report here in front | 24 | Q. She used two reports. |
| 25 | of me now, at page 11 of your report, it's | 25 | DR. LAZAR: |




|  | Page 197 |  | calendar year, versus accident year? |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | to the difference between the GISA number | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | and this 87 percent number. | 2 | DR. LAZAR: |  |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C. | 3 | A. | Undoubtedly, there will be timing issues. |
| 4 | Q. I think they were drawing your attention to | 4 |  | There will be differences, you know. Can I |
| 5 | the fact that the 85 and 87 percents were so | 5 |  | predict what they might be from year to |
| 6 | close. Were they not doing that? | 6 |  | year, no, I can't, I don't know. |
| 7 | DR. LAZAR: | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 8 | A. That's not how I interpreted the question. | 8 | Q. | I'm going to just ask you to - we're going |
| 9 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 9 |  | to turn to page 109 in Ms. Elliott's |
| 10 | Q. Okay. In 3b you are asked by the Public | 10 | presentation on the 6th of September, please |  |
| 11 | Utilities Board, "In comparing loss ratio | 11 | I'm sorry, September 6th, Ms. Elliott's |  |
| 12 | findings, explain what consideration Dr. | 12 |  | transcript. Sorry about that. |
| 13 | Lazar and Dr. Prisman gave to the | 13 |  | KEAN: |
| 14 | differences in accident year versus calendar | 14 | Q. Page? |  |
| 15 | year definition of loss ratios." And | 15 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 16 | there's an answer to that given - | 16 | Q. Page 109. Can you see that, Mr. Lazar? DR LAZAR. |  |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 |  |  |
| 18 | A. We did not answer that. | 18 | A. Yes. |  |
| 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 19 | STAMP, Q.C.: |  |
| 20 | Q. Oh, you did. | 20 | Q. | So Ms. Elliott says, "The information that's provided where we do our analysis of estimating what the ultimate losses will be is provided by coverage on an accident year basis, and we also as part of the review process wanted to review the coverage |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 |  |  |
| 22 | A. Uh? | 22 |  |  |
| 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 23 |  |  |
| 24 | Q. You give an answer. It's at-in your | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | responses. | 25 |  |  |
| DR. LAZAR: Page 198 |  |  |  | information that is only available by |
|  |  | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | A. I refer to the answer to 1a. | 2 |  | accident year, and it would be the standard |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 3 |  | way to review pricing review work is on an |
| 4 | Q. Yes, but I'm looking at your response to | 4 |  | accident year basis. So when companies |
| 5 | question 3 - | 5 |  | submit rate applications, it's using |
| 6 | DR. LAZAR: | 6 |  | accident year data, and so this review was |
| 7 | A. I don't know what the difference would be | 7 |  | looking at a hindsight review of the return |
| 8 | between calendar and financial year, year by | 8 |  | on equity that was achieved and measuring |
| 9 | year, since we didn't have sort of the | 9 |  | that against is a 10 percent target that |
| 10 | calendar and accident year because we didn't | 10 |  | would be allowed in rates, and that is all |
| 11 | have the accident year data. So - | 11 |  | done on an accident year basis. So the |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 |  | detailed data is available by accident year. |
| 13 | Q. I'm sorry, what did you say again? I'm | 13 |  | If you look at the calendar year data, it's |
| 14 | sorry, Mr. Lazar. | 14 |  | done on a higher level, so it's third party |
| 15 | A. Okay, I think your question was-sorry, I'm | 15 |  | liability accident benefits and all other |
| 16 | going to refer back to your-"In comparing" | 16 |  | coverages combined. It doesn't have the |
| 17 | yes. "What consideration"-"gave to the | 17 |  | same detail as the accident year data does, |
| 18 | differences"-we did not give any because we | 18 |  | and also the calendar year data is net of |
| 19 | did not have the accident year data. Okay. | 19 |  | reinsurance arrangements, whereas when we're |
| 20 | You said the data we used was annual data? | 20 |  | looking at pricing, it's all done before any |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 |  | financial reinsurance, and that's done kind |
| 22 | A. Yes. | 22 |  | of after the fact by the financial |
| 23 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 23 |  | departments in insurance companies". Can you |
| 24 | Q. And do you not accept that there's an | 24 |  | respond to that? Do you have anything to |
| 25 | important distinction between annual year, | 25 |  | say to that observation that Ms. Elliott has |


|  | Page 201 |  | Page 203 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | made about why it's important to use | 1 | you could tell of any jurisdiction that used |
| 2 | accident year and not calendar year? | 2 | that model to do ROE for auto insurance? |
| 3 | DR. LAZAR: | 3 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 4 | A. Again my response will be two-fold. One, | 4 | A. Other jurisdiction? |
| 5 | I'll accept there are going to be, | 5 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 6 | obviously, differences in whatever analysis | 6 | Q. That used that model for automobile |
| 7 | you want to undertake, and, you know, I have | 7 | insurance? |
| 8 | no reason to quarrel with this, and my | 8 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 9 | second comment is, I refer you back to my | 9 | A. I can sort of go back to the work we did for |
| 10 | dissertations that I've repeated several | 10 | the Ontario Energy Board, and when we looked |
| 11 | times before, and no need to repeat it now. | 11 | at other jurisdictions, Canada, US, there |
| 12 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 12 | were several in the US that were using this |
| 13 | Q. Thank you. I'm going to turn for one moment | 13 | model for regulating electrical utilities. |
| 14 | to a report that you prepared for the | 14 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 15 | Ontario Trial Lawyers. | 15 | Q. Okay, electrical utilities, sure, but I'm |
| 16 | DR. LAZAR: | 16 | asking whether you - |
| 17 | A. Yeah. | 17 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 18 | A. For the automobile insurance, FSCO never |
| 19 | Q. It was done April, 2018. You may recall all | 19 | asked us to do this, so we never did it for |
| 20 | of that. | 20 | them. I've never followed up and looked at |
| 21 | DR. LAZAR: | 21 | it. |
| 22 | A. Yeah, well, you're assuming my memory is | 22 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 23 | better than it is, thank you. | 23 | Q. But were you asked by the Board here whether |
| 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 24 | that approach was followed by any other rate |
| 25 | Q. It's just April. | 25 | regulator? |
|  | Page 202 |  | Page 204 |
| 1 | DR. LAZAR: | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | A. Um? | 2 | A. That was one of the questions. |
| 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 3 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 4 | Q. It's only just April. | 4 | Q. And did you have an answer? |
| 5 | DR. LAZAR: | 5 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 6 | A. Thank you for giving me the benefit of the | 6 | A. I don't know. |
| 7 | doubt. | 7 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 8 | STAMP, Q.C.: | 8 | Q. Of any? |
| 9 | Q. When that shows up, turn to page six, if I | 9 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 10 | can, please. This is a discussion on ROE, | 10 | A. No, no, I don't know if any are using it. |
| 11 | as you'll see in a moment when it comes up, | 11 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 12 | page 6 , the bottom of the page, please. | 12 | Q. Thank you, okay. Now to come back to what |
| 13 | Thank you, and you'll see this last full | 13 | you said here, you recommended to FSCO - I |
| 14 | paragraph. It says, "Several years ago my | 14 | take it this is a recommendation to FSCO, is |
| 15 | colleague at the Schulich School of | 15 | that what you were saying? |
| 16 | Business, Professor Eli Prisman, and I, were | 16 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 17 | retained by FSCO to determine whether the 12 | 17 | A. At that time, yes. |
| 18 | percent benchmark continued to be | 18 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 19 | appropriate in light of the changed | 19 | Q. And when I look at this paragraph, we saw on |
| 20 | financial and economic environments. In our | 20 | your CV some reference to a 2015 report. Is |
| 21 | study for FSCO, we estimated ROE caps for | 21 | that what you mean by several years ago? |
| 22 | 2013 ranging between 4.2 percent and 5.3 | 22 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 23 | percent based on capital asset pricing | 23 | A. Where is this several years ago? |
| 24 | model". Now were you asked by the Public | 24 | STAMP, Q.C.: |
| 25 | Utilities Board in their questions whether | 25 | Q. In the part - you said several years - |



|  | Page 209 |  | Page 211 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | setting automobile insurance rates should be | 1 | the period 2011 to 2016, it's 5.5 percent, |
| 2 | at 9.63 percent. | 2 | so slightly higher than his number, and if |
|  | BROWNE, Q.C.: | 3 | you take the average of the risk-free rate |
| 4 | Q. "And in considering the issue of the | 4 | that we use, which is about one and a half |
| 5 | appropriate ROE for automobile insurance | 5 | percent, add those two together and it gives |
| 6 | benchmark rates in the Province, the Board | 6 | you an upper limit of seven percent, which |
| 7 | found Dr. Kalymon's evidence and testimony | 7 | is - |
| 8 | most instructive and compelling" and went | 8 | BROWNE, Q.C.: |
| 9 | on, "the Board finds that an ROE of ten | 9 | Q. So, the rate of return should have been |
| 10 | percent is reasonable for the use in | 10 | closer to seven percent based on those |
| 11 | determining the 2005 benchmark rates for | 11 | values if you were to find - |
| 12 | automobile insurance." | 12 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 13 | Now, what are - this was 2005. Can you | 13 | A. Just on those values. If you take into |
| 14 | give us generally what happened to the 30- | 14 | account our calculations and that beta, it's |
| 15 | year Canada bond rate after that period and | 15 | closer to six percent. |
| 16 | indeed the ten-year Canada bond? Can you | 16 | BROWNE, Q.C.: |
| 17 | give us some history of that? | 17 | Q. Now, there's a general criticism of utility |
| 18 | (1.45 p.m.) | 18 | boards across the country, regulators across |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | the country in reference to not accepting |
| 20 | A. Let me just go to - what rate did we use | 20 | the new values of the new economy. I see |
| 21 | here. Okay. We wouldn't use either of | 21 | you're smiling there. In that rates of |
| 22 | those, but nevertheless what happened from | 22 | return seem to be set minus consideration of |
| 23 | 2005 to onwards, especially following | 23 | the long term Canada bonds and the ten-year |
| 24 | September 2008 with the financial market | 24 | bonds and indeed the interest rates. Do you |
| 25 | collapse in prices, that interest rates, | 25 | have any comments on that? |
|  | Page 210 |  | Page 212 |
| 1 | short, medium and long term collapsed. They | 1 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 2 | all declined very sharply. And only in the | 2 | A. Yeah. Both in the Ontario Energy Board case |
| 3 | past two or three years, the ten-year and | 3 | and the automobile insurance case with FSCO, |
| 4 | the 30 -year bond rates in Canada have edged | 4 | the regulated companies argued quite |
| 5 | upwards. They'll still well below the five | 5 | vociferously this would be disastrous, |
| 6 | percent level in that period, you know, pre- | 6 | they'll pull out. They're going to leave |
| 7 | 2005. Short rates are still at historically | 7 | the industry. They're going to leave the |
| 8 | low levels and somewhere in the one, one and | 8 | country. And the boards, in both cases, |
| 9 | a half percent range. | 9 | wasn't really willing to challenge them, |
| 10 | BROWNE, Q.C.: | 10 | thinking "what if they do? Then we look |
| 11 | Q. So, therefore, if these are the benchmarks | 11 | rather stupid." So, in both those cases, |
| 12 | for establishing the ROE and these factors | 12 | they capitulated, you know. |
| 13 | are lower now, certainly you apply them, | 13 | Did they do the right thing or not? |
| 14 | should we be having an ROE of ten percent? | 14 | I'm not going to speculate on that. But |
| 15 | Would that be reasonable in the current | 15 | that's what happened. Those are the same |
| 16 | environment? Just roughly. | 16 | argument in both cases, different types of |
| 17 | DR. LAZAR: | 17 | companies, different industries, but with a |
| 18 | A. Not at all. Even if you accept Professor | 18 | threat that they were going to exit if the |
| 19 | Kalymon's estimate of the beta, take his | 19 | returns were too low. I personally didn't |
| 20 | one, he never sort of calculated that. He | 20 | think that would happen, but I didn't offer |
| 21 | just assumed that was the right value. We | 21 | that opinion. I'm not the one that had to |
| 22 | actually did calculate and came up with a | 22 | make the final decision. And I didn't have |
| 23 | lower value. But if you accept that, a | 23 | to report to political masters. So, it's |
| 24 | value of one, and we've got in our Table 11 | 24 | easy for me to say this is what it should |
| 25 | what the risk premium has been averaged over | 25 |  |


| be. Page 213 |  | feature. Page 215 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | BROWNE, Q.C.: | 2 | DR. LAZAR: |  |  |
| 3 | And there's some thought that follows that that ratepayers haven't got the full value | 3 | A. I'm a firm supporter of simplicity. |  |  |
| 4 |  | 4 |  | NNE, Q.C.: |  |
| 5 | that ratepayers haven't got the full value of this changing financial economy because | 5 | Q | Yes. |  |
| 6 | boards have been reluctant to lower rates of | 6 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 7 | return consistent with that economy. Is | 7 | A. | Hearings, there are ti | have |
| 8 | that a fair comment? | 8 |  | values. Most often th | mental |
| 9 | DR. LAZAR: | 9 |  | cost burden to everyb | y a waste |
| 10 | Absolutely, and that was the point I was | 10 |  | of time. I'm not a fan |  |
| 11 | trying to make in my repeated dissertations | 11 |  | think issues can be reso | uickly. |
| 12 | why we can quibble the numbers, but at the | 12 |  | So, is an automatic fo | y to go? |
| 13 | end of the day, there's a difference between | 13 |  | Yes. You're going to | ng to |
| 14 | the ROE that was allowed and the ROE that | 14 |  | determine what that fo | look |
| 15 | should have been allowed. That's one of the | 15 |  | like, what should go | n it's |
| 16 | major issues. | 16 |  | on auto pilot. |  |
| 17 | BROWNE, Q.C.: | 17 |  | NNE, Q.C.: |  |
| 18 | And I know in this particular jurisdiction, at one point, at least for the energy utility, there was an automatic adjustment formula in place back - requested by the utility actually and brought evidence of how it would be more beneficial to us all, in 1998, I do believe, 1999, and indeed, the Board implemented an automatic adjustment | 18 | Q. | Yes. |  |
| 19 |  | 19 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 20 |  | 20 | A. | Period. |  |
| 21 |  | 21 |  | NNE, Q.C.: |  |
| 22 |  | 22 | Q | Because it seems to m | ulators |
| 23 |  | 23 |  | across the country hav | to the |
| 24 |  | 24 |  | regulated by compens | ore in this |
| 25 |  | 25 |  | particular economy. | ment? |
|  | Page 214 |  |  |  | Page 216 |
| 1 | formula based on the long term Canada and | 1 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 2 | the ten-year, an average of those, and plus | 2 | A. | That's been the net res | ot just |
| 3 | put three percent on top of that which | 3 |  | Canada, but you see th | in the US |
| 4 | became the rate of return for the company. | 4 |  | as well. |  |
| 5 | It set the range for the rate of return. | 5 |  | NE, Q.C.: |  |
| 6 | And I remember anecdotally, the first | 6 | Q. | Is there a role for the | this? |
| 7 | year in which it was implemented, there was | 7 |  | That the legislature sho | e of the |
| 8 | press releases from the utility saying how | 8 |  | situation as it is and tha |  |
| 9 | pleased they were because their rates went | 9 |  | set based on long term | ercentages |
| 10 | up. Well, lo and behold, then we got the | 10 |  | and for them to give mor | to the |
| 11 | new economy and all of a sudden, the | 11 |  | regulator when setting | n in |
| 12 | automatic adjustment formula was no longer | 12 |  | the interest of consum |  |
| 13 | applicable to the utility. They said "we | 13 |  | AZAR: |  |
| 14 | can't make any money like this", when | 14 | A. | Well, the government | board, |
| 15 | actually if it had to stay in place, we | 15 |  | gives the board the man | ld the |
| 16 | probably wouldn't be talking about the | 16 |  | legislature pass a law | should |
| 17 | overcompensation and the rate of return of | 17 |  | be a set formula and the |  |
| 18 | the insurance industry and perhaps, no | 18 |  | auto pilot thereafter? I |  |
| 19 | doubt, of the utilities. | 19 |  | should. Then it would | board to |
| 20 | Do you have any comment on the | 20 |  | again have a hearing a | the |
| 21 | implementation of an automatic adjustment | 21 |  | formula and the inputs |  |
| 22 | formula as opposed to going through these | 22 |  | NE, Q.C.: |  |
| 23 | processes, based on the long term rate or | 23 |  | Thank you, Dr. Lazar. |  |
| 24 | the short term rate? Because the Canada | 24 |  |  |  |
| 25 | bond really is what is the distinguishing | 25 | Q. | Any questions? |  |


|  | Page 217 |  | Page 219 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | COMMISSIONER OXFORD: | 1 | changing return on equity from ten to six |
| 2 | Q. No. | 2 | percent, accepting everything else in the |
| 3 | CHAIR: | 3 | Oliver Wyman report, we get overpayments of |
| 4 | Q. Anything - | 4 | three percent year in year out. |
| 5 | MR. FELTHAM: | 5 | Now, what if we change - reduce the |
| 6 | Q. Just one to go back to - I'm not sure we | 6 | expense ratio? Take the four percent return |
| 7 | have a fulsome answer on one question that | 7 | on investment, the six percent return on |
| 8 | was put to you by Mr. Stamp, Dr. Lazar, with | 8 | equity, but we're also reducing the expense |
| 9 | respect to - the questions concerning can we | 9 | ratio. What is the result? Now you get |
| 10 | take the numbers from Oliver Wyman, you | 10 | overpayments of five and a half percent per |
| 11 | know, and put those in; that that's somehow | 11 | year. So, change that assumption. Well, |
| 12 | going to change your opinion with respect to | 12 | now what if we go one step further, change |
| 13 | what the overpayment looks like. And you | 13 | expense ratio, change return on investment |
| 14 | indicated "well, I've looked more closely at | 14 | to six percent, the return on equity to six |
| 15 | that and I've done some calculations to kind | 15 | percent, what does this do? It increases |
| 16 | of get a sense of what that might be", and I | 16 | the overpayments each year by six percent. |
| 17 | think it's important that the Board hear | 17 | So, ranges from three to six percent |
| 18 | from you on that point. | 18 | per year. What are the premiums on average |
| 19 | DR. LAZAR: | 19 | here? They're running around 300 million. |
| 20 | A. Okay. Again, there's a simple formula for | 20 | Apply these numbers. So that means |
| 21 | how you define profits, underwriting profits | 21 | overpayments of 9 to 18 million per year at |
| 22 | plus whatever investment returns there are. | 22 | the current premium rate. Plain and simple. |
| 23 | Simple formula for then determining what the | 23 | Doesn't matter what the end profitability is |
| 24 | return on equity, can play around with it, | 24 | of the insurance companies. If you plug in |
| 25 | and what you get then is premiums depending | 25 | different expense ratios, different return |
|  | Page 218 |  | Page 220 |
| 1 | upon key assumptions, such as operating | 1 | on investments, more importantly different |
| 2 | expense, return investment, return on equity | 2 | return on equity, you're going to get |
| 3 | equals some multiple of whatever the claims | 3 | overpayments. Everything else just becomes |
| 4 | are expected for that year. So, it's a | 4 | irrelevant noise. |
| 5 | straightforward exercise. I'm quite happy | 5 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 6 | to sort of write out the formula and send it | 6 | Q. Thank you. |
| 7 | along to you. | 7 | CHAIR: |
| 8 | But nevertheless, plugged in that | 8 | Q. Thank you, Mr. Feltham. Thank you very |
| 9 | formula and I just did some rough | 9 | much, Dr. Lazar. |
| 10 | calculations and I said, okay, what if we | 10 | DR. LAZAR: |
| 11 | take the Oliver Wyman assumptions as a | 11 | A. Oh, my pleasure. |
| 12 | starting point this is how premiums should | 12 | CHAIR: |
| 13 | have been set, and I used their expense | 13 | Q. Wish you safe travels home this evening. |
| 14 | ratio of 26 percent on average, four percent | 14 | We're back here tomorrow morning at nine |
| 15 | return on investment, ten percent return on | 15 | with Dr. - please help me with his |
| 16 | equity. So, that would give us some | 16 | pronunciation. |
| 17 | multiple of premiums to whatever the claims | 17 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 18 | are. | 18 | Q. Madam Chair, I think 9:00 we're going to |
| 19 | And so, okay, now let's adjust those. | 19 | begin with the Consumer Advocate presenter. |
| 20 | Let's adjust - let's take the 26 percent | 20 | CHAIR: |
| 21 | expense ratio, four percent return on | 21 | Q. Oh, we switched? |
| 22 | investment and only change the return on | 22 | MR. FELTHAM: |
| 23 | equity. What difference does this make? | 23 | Q. Yeah. |
| 24 | And the difference is three percent of | 24 | CHAIR: |
| 25 | premium overpayments each year. So, just by | 25 | Q. Okay. All right. |



## CERTIFICATE

I, Judy Moss, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript in the matter of the 2017 Automobile Insurance Review heard before the Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, 120 Torbay Road, St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador and was transcribed by me to the best of my ability by means of a sound apparatus.

Dated at St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador this 13th day of September, 2018

Judy Moss

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1 MR. FELTHAM:
2 Q. So, he has some flexibility.
3 CHAIR:
4 Q. That does give us time to finish?
5 MR. FELTHAM:
6 Q. I hope so.
7 CHAIR:
8 Q. Okay. All right. Have a nice evening 9 everyone.
10 UPON CONCLUSION AT 2:00 P.M.

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